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1. INTRODUCTION
Google, Bing, and Yahoo are the primary gateways to the Internet
for most people in the United States. Google is worth more than $260
1. Brad Stone, Sure, It's Big. But Is That Bad?, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010, at BUl; see
also Benjamin G. Edelman, Google 's Dominance - And What To Do About It, ACSBLOG
(Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/google%/ E2%80%99s-dominance-%/ E2%80
%93-and-what-to-do-about-it.
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billion, and Yahoo is worth more than $25 billion.2 These lofty mar-
ket capitalizations are almost entirely attributable to the income gen-
erated by the advertising that accompanies search results. 3
Most searches result in one or more paid ads appearing alongside
the unpaid (organic or algorithmic) results. The specific ads that ap-
pear are selected because they relate to the search terms ("keywords")
entered by the user. For example, a search for "bicycle" will return
ads from stores and websites selling bikes as well as bike manufactur-
ers. A search for "wedding" will return ads from stores and websites
selling wedding supplies, wedding dresses, and wedding cakes. A
search for "mesothelioma" will return ads from plaintiffs' attorneys.
Each of these entities pays the search engine if its ad is clicked on,
irrespective of whether a sale is ultimately made.4
When search engines began offering ads using trademarks as
keywords, disgruntled trademark owners filed more than one hundred
lawsuits in the United States and Europe.5 Despite the volume of liti-
gation, there has been little independent empirical work on consumer
goals and expectations when using trademarks as search terms, on
whether consumers are actually confused by search results, and on
which entities are buying trademarks as keywords. Instead, judges
have relied heavily on their own intuitions, based on little more than
armchair empiricism, to resolve such matters.
We report on the results of a two-part study, including three
online consumer surveys and a coding study of the results when 2500
trademarks were run through three search engines. Consumer goals
and expectations turn out to be quite heterogeneous: a majority of
consumers use brand names to search primarily for the branded goods,
2. Google Inc. Stock Quote & Summary Data, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/
symbol/goog (last visited May 9, 2013); Yahoo! Inc. Stock Quote & Summary Data,
NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/yhoo (last visited May 9, 2013). It is difficult to
put a value on Bing, since it is part of Microsoft, but one set of analysts estimated it was
worth about $11 billion. Robert Cyran & Martin Hutchinson, At Microsoft, Bing Too Costly
to Keep, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2011, at B2.
3. Advertising revenue made up 97% of Google's first quarter revenues in 2011. Google
Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 27 (Apr. 25, 2012), available at
http://investor.google.com/pdf/20120331_google_10Q.pdf For Yahoo, the figure is 80%.
Yahoo Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 37 (May 9, 2012), available at
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/YHOO/2326254543x0xS 1193125-11-134295/
1011006/filing.pdf; see also Steven Levy, Secret of Googlenomics: Data-Fueled Recipe
Brews Profitability, WIRED (May 22, 2009), http://www.wired.com/culture/
culturereviews/magazine/17-06/nepgooglenomics (quoting then-Google CEO Eric Schmidt
that after the implementation of a new version of AdWords, "[a]ll of a sudden we realized
we were in the auction business").
4. See Cost-Per-Click Bidding, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/
answer.py?hl=en&answer=2464960&topic=1713914&path=1713956-1713909&ctx=leftnav
(last visited May 9, 2013).
5. A list of the filed cases we have been able to identify as of June 2012 is available from
the authors on request.
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but most consumers are open to purchasing competing products.6 We
find little evidence of traditional actionable consumer confusion re-
garding the source of goods, but only a small minority of consumers
correctly and consistently distinguished paid ads from unpaid search
results,7 or noticed the labels that search engines use to differentiate
paid ads from unpaid search results.8
We also find that the aggregate risk of consumer confusion is
low, because most of the ads triggered by the use of trademarks as
keywords are for authorized sellers or the trademark owners them-
selves. 9 Perhaps our most intriguing finding is the sizeable mismatch
between consumer sentiments and the protections provided by U.S.
trademark law. After we excluded those who were unsure or had no
opinion, survey respondents were evenly split on whether it was fair
and appropriate for competitors to purchase one another's trademarks
for use as keywords, even without any confusion as to source, spon-
sorship, or affiliation. 10 These findings may explain why European
trademark law recognizes a cause of action for taking unfair ad-
vantage of a trademark.1 1 Although the law need not precisely match
common moral intuitions, our findings suggest that it may be desira-
ble to create a similar cause of action under U.S. trademark law.
Although we do find some evidence of confusion, the types of
confusion we document do not map neatly onto the categories recog-
nized by U.S. trademark law. Our findings suggest that the develop-
ment of the doctrine in this area has not been well served by the
reliance of judges on casual empiricism in resolving these disputes.
6. See infra Table 6.
7. See infra Table 4, Panel B.
8. See infra Table 7.
9. See infra Table 2.
10. For two of the three ads, approximately 53% of those who had an opinion thought it
was not fair and appropriate. For the third ad, 42% of those who had an opinion thought it
was not fair and appropriate. For each ad, 25% of those responding did not have an opinion.
See infra Table 13.
11. A European Union directive protects trademark owners from taking unfair advantage
of the distinctive character of a registered mark. See generally Council Directive 89/104, art.
5, 1988 O.J. (L 40) (EU). This prohibition allows a trademark owner to stop others from
using marks that are identical or similar to the registered mark when doing so "takes unfair
advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark."
Id. at 6-7. An advertiser takes unfair advantage when they select a keyword that is similar
or identical to an established trademark, "in order to benefit from the power of attraction,
the reputation and the prestige of that mark and to exploit, without paying any financial
compensation, the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of the mark in order to create
and maintain the mark's image." L'Oreal SA v. Bellure NV, Case C-487/07, para 50, 2009
ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 532 (June 18, 2009).
However, if an advertiser that selects a reputable trademark as a keyword is only doing so
to present an alternative to the trademark owner's goods or services, that use is fair competi-
tion as long as the advertiser does not blur, tarnish, or adversely affect the primary trade-
mark. Interflora Inc., Interflora British Unit v. Marks & Spencer plc, Flowers Direct Online
Ltd., Case C-323/09, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 2120 (Sept. 22, 2011).
[Vol. 26484
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Much remains to be done to ensure that trademark doctrine is empiri-
cally well-grounded, and "fits" the online context.
Part II provides some context for this dispute, including back-
ground on search engines and keyword searches. Part III outlines the
extensive litigation, both foreign and domestic, over the use of trade-
marks as keywords, and identifies six assumptions that judges have
made in resolving these cases. Part IV presents our empirical results.
Part V discusses our findings, and Part VI concludes.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE ISSUES
A. Overview
In 2004, Google started selling keywords that were also trade-
marks.12 Conflict quickly arose. The problem is straightforward. If I
run a search for American Airlines, and Delta Airlines appears in a
paid ad on the search output page because Delta Airlines purchased
"American Airlines" as a keyword, does American Airlines have any
recourse? If so, against whom? Google? Delta Airlines? Both? Nei-
ther? What if Travelocity, which sells flights on both American Air-
lines and Delta Airlines, appears in a paid ad? Should the outcome
turn on whether the paid ad uses the words "American Airlines" in the
ad text?
Trademark law is primarily intended to prevent confusion about
the origins of trademarked goods and services, but is it plausible that a
consumer who searches for American Airlines and then buys a ticket
on Delta Airlines was ever confused about which carrier he will be
flying on? Even if the consumer is not confused about the airline he
ultimately selects, should diversion of attention, however temporary,
create a cause of action?
Should the mode or level of trade make any difference in the
analysis? For example, searchers can obtain a reservation for a room
at a Hyatt hotel either directly from Hyatt's website or from a travel
website (e.g., Orbitz, Travelocity, getaroom.com, etc.). Hyatt makes
more money if searchers deal directly with them, instead of going
through a travel website.13 Does Hyatt have a valid complaint if travel
12. See infra Part II.C. Earlier disputes had involved the use of trademarks as domain
names and metatags. Dan L. Burk, Cybermarks, 94 MINN. L. REv. 1375, 1376-81 (2010).
13. See Peter M. Ripin, Keyword Confusion, HOSPITALITY.NET (May 1, 2007),
http://www.hospitalitynet.org/news/4031253.html (noting that hotels "have to pay a com-
mission of approximately 18-30% to the online travel agency," and "[s]ince a hotel's own
branded Website produces the highest average daily rate, it is clearly in the hotel's best
interest to drive Internet business to its own site rather than to an online travel agent"). See
also Jane L. Levere, American Airlines in Fee Battle ivith Web Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
5, 2011, at BI (noting that "to sell an average, round-trip domestic ticket, American must
pay $10 to $12, for global distribution and agency incentive fees, on online agency book-
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websites purchase the Hyatt trademark as a keyword? Should the out-
come turn on where consumers ultimately make reservations after
searching for "Hyatt"? Does the fact that Hyatt makes less money if
reservations are made through travel websites have any legal signifi-
cance?
Of course, Hyatt can capture some of these reservations if it bids
on its own trademark, but should Hyatt have to pay for the use of a
trademark it already owns? 14 Hyatt could prohibit travel websites with
which it does business from purchasing its trademark as a keyword,
but that would leave the field open to its competitors to buy higher
placement for their ads.15
What if someone searches for Rolex, and three ads come up: one
for Seiko, one for a seller of counterfeit Rolexes, and one for a store
ings, while it costs the carrier only $2 to $3 - for administrative and marketing expenses -
to sell the same ticket on its own Web site").
Early on, companies used pop-up ads to try to divert traffic from competitors. Peter M.
Ripin, Hotel Internet Marketers Beware: Pop-up and Keyword Advertising Threaten Your
On-line Brand, WIREDHOTELIER.COM (Oct. 26, 2004), http://www.wiredhotelier.com/
news//4021026.html. One commenter at the time noted a prominent example:
[A] recently published report stated that a number of our most promi-
nent companies were now using popup ads to target their competi-
tors' websites including Best Western whose ads appeared on 208
other sites including those of Comfort Inn and Day's Inn; Thrifty
Rent A Car whose ads were aimed at Dollar-Rent-A-Car and Enter-
prise Rent-A-Car and Verizon DSL whose ads were triggered by vis-
its to the sites of broadband provider competitors.
Id.
14. See Scott Cleland, Google 21st Century Robber Baron, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottcleland/2011/09/19/google-21st-century-robber-baron
("Google shortchanges trademark owners by forcing them to buy their own trademark prop-
erty as keyword advertising in order to protect their businesses from Google selling their
trademarks to competitors. In the physical world this scheme is known as a 'protection
racket."'). Trademark owners have made similar complaints about the Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers' addition of new top-level domains. Dennis S. Prahl &
Eric Null, The New Generic Top-Level Domain Program: A New Era of Risk for Trademark
Owners and the Internet, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1757, 1759 (2011).
15. Cf Johanna Jainchill, Carnival Brands' Keyword Rule Gives Rivals a Boost, TRAVEL
WKLY. (Jan. 31, 2010), http://www.travelweekly.com/Cruise-Travel/Carnival-brands'-
keyword-rule-gives-rivals-a-boost (describing a similar situation after cruise lines restricted
travel agencies from using their trademarks). An observer noted the greater prominence of
rival sites once the travel agencies ceased advertising:
Carnival Corp. brands' decision to prohibit travel agencies from bid-
ding on their trademarks as keywords in online search engines led to
what would seem to be an unintended consequence: a higher place-
ment for the sponsored links of competing cruise lines . . . . "It
doesn't make sense that Carnival would prefer to have their competi-
tion's website right up at the top of the search results, instead of peo-
ple who actually sell Carnival cruises . . . ."
Id. (quoting an anonymous cruise seller and former Carnival keyword bidder).
Marriott and Intercontinental Hotels have also prohibited online travel agencies from
bidding on their trademarks. Five Cruise Lines Ban Agencies from Bidding on Keywords,
AIR TRANSPORT WORLD (Jan. 6, 2010), hftp://atwonline.com/it-distribution/news/five-
cruise-lines-ban-agencies-bidding-keywords-0309-0.
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selling genuine Rolex and Seiko watches. Does Rolex have a case
against any or all of them? If Rolex has a case, what needs to be es-
tablished? Does the bare fact that a competitor or counterfeiter pur-
chased another company's trademark as a keyword establish the
necessary elements of trademark infringement? Are there any defens-
es available to those who purchased a trademark to use as a keyword,
and to the search engine that sold it? Does it matter if the resulting ad
is simply comparative? For example, "our watches have the same de-
sign features as a Rolex, but cost less." Does it matter that the store
sells both Rolex and Seiko watches? Does it matter if the individual
who conducted the search was using Rolex as a generic proxy term
for "expensive watches"?
These questions are not law school hypotheticals. In well over
one hundred cases in U.S. and foreign courts, disgruntled trademark
owners have sued Google and other search engines, as well as the en-
tities that have purchased trademarks as keywords.16 Courts have var-
ied in their approaches to these cases, in many instances showing
considerable skepticism about the merits,17 while in other instances
expanding the law to include conduct outside the traditional ambit of
trademark doctrine. 18 Judges in both camps have routinely engaged in
armchair empiricism, making casual assumptions about such matters
as why consumers use trademarks as search terms, consumer
knowledge about the difference between paid and unpaid links, and
the likelihood of confusion when competitors purchase one another's
trademarks for use as search engine keywords. 19
The sale of search engine keywords, whether trademarked or not,
also raises interesting consumer protection issues. As noted previous-
ly, a search engine typically returns both paid and unpaid results.
Consumer protection law requires a "clear and conspicuous" disclo-
16. See supra note 5.
17. See, e.g., J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. LP v. Settlement Funding LLC, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d
1780, 1786 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Designer Skin, LLC v. S & L Vitamins, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d
811, 818-19 (D. Ariz. 2008).
18. See, e.g., Storus Corp. v. Aroa Mktg. Inc., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d 1032, 1035-36 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (noting that the infringing act in the Internet context is diversion of consumers even
where consumers know they are not going to plaintiffs site because the defendant improp-
erly benefits from the owner's goodwill); Partners for Health and Home, LP v. Yang, 98
U.S.P.Q.2d 1462, 1467 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (stating that actual confusion is not needed to find
initial interest confusion since initial interest confusion is based on defendant's misappro-
priation of plaintiffs goodwill); Partners for Health and Home, L.P. v. Yang, No. CV 09-
07849-RZ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130921, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2011) (holding that
use of a competitor's trademark as a keyword constitutes infringement absent circumstances
negating confusion); Austl. Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006)
("Initial interest confusion results when a consumer seeks a particular trademark holder's
product and instead is lured to the product of a competitor by the competitor's use of the
same or a similar mark.").
19. For discussion of six specific types of judicial armchair empiricism, see infra Part
111.A.2.
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sure of paid content.20 Are search engines complying with these re-
quirements? How have search engines changed their descriptions of
paid content over time? Do changes made by search engines result in
greater awareness of the difference between paid and unpaid content?
Do these changes affect click-through behavior? The Federal Trade
Commission has expressed concern about the labeling and page archi-
tecture of search engine results, but has not brought any cases to
date. 2 1
We focus on Google in this Article because it is the dominant
search engine. However, where appropriate, we describe differences
in the way in which Google, Bing, and Yahoo present and label search
results.
B. Search Engine Output Architecture and Labeling
We are confident that every reader of this Article has a general
understanding of how Google organizes its search output. However,
for those happy few who have no knowledge of Google's search page
architecture, but for some reason have chosen to read this Article,
Figure 1 is a screenshot of the results when "Mercedes" was used as a
search term in 2011. 22
20. See generally FED. TRADE COMM'N, DOT COM DISCLOSURES: INFORMATION ABOUT
ONLINE ADVERTISING (2000), available at http://business.ftc.gov/documents/bus41-dot-
com-disclosures-information-about-online-advertising.
21. See Letter from Heather Hippsley, Acting Assoc. Dir., Div. of Adver. Practices, Fed.
Trade Comm'n, to Gary Ruskin, Exec. Dir., Commercial Alert (June 27, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/commercialalertletter.shtm. In 2013, Google agreed to
change some of its business practices in response to FTC concerns, but the labeling of its
search results was not part of the settlement. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Google
Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC Competition Concerns in the Mar-
kets for Devices Like Smart Phones, Gamnes and Tablets, and in Online Search (Jan. 3,
2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/01/google.shtm.
22. This screenshot was captured on December 16, 2011 and used as part of the third sur-
vey, as described below. We have modified the image so that it is easier to see the different
regions of the search output.
After research for this Article was completed, Google revised the architecture of its
search output page and created a new "Google Shopping" section. Sameer Samat, Building
a Better Shopping Experience, GOOGLE COM. BLOG (May 31, 2012), http://
googlecommerce.blogspot.com/2012/05/building-better-shopping-experience.html. The new
section, which appears under either Section 1 or Section 2 in Figure 1, is labeled "Spon-
sored." Id. Thus, Google is simultaneously using the terms "Ads" and "Sponsored" to refer
to paid content. The impact of these changes on consumer perceptions is the subject of an
ongoing empirical study.
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Figure 1: Google Search of "Mercedes"
As Figure 1 reflects, Google's search output from 2011 has sever-
al discrete sections. At the top of the page is a small search box, with
links to various types of search output (e.g., web, images, videos,
maps, news, shopping, mail, and "more"). To the left, a column large-
ly replicates the links in the top zone, along with links to change the
region that Google uses as the search location, and a tool with which
to specify the time period searched. Below and to the right are three
sections containing search information. The shaded top section, Sec-
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tion A, contains various search results and associated links, which are
labeled "Ads."2 3 The right-hand column, Section B, contains more
search results and associated links, and is labeled "Ads" as well,
though the background is not shaded. Finally, underneath Section A
and to the left of Section B is Section C, with more search results and
associated links.
The links in Section A and Section B are all paid ads. Each link
that appears in these areas of the search results page is there because
the relevant site won the right to appear by bidding in an auction of
keywords run by Google.24 Conversely, the links in Section C are
unpaid "organic" or "algorithmic" content, which appear as a result of
Google's search program.25
Bing labels its paid links using the same terminology ("Ads") and
the same search page architecture.26 Yahoo labels paid links with the
term "Sponsored Results" but uses the same search page architecture
as Bing.
Prior to November 2010, Google labeled paid links as "Sponsored
Links." 28 Prior to April 2011, Bing labeled paid links as "Sponsored
Sites." 29 Other search engines have used a wide array of labels to
identify paid links at one time or another, including "Featured List-
ings," "Premier Listings," "Recommended Sites," "Search Partners,"
and "Spotlight." 30
C. Keyword Auctions
Google began AdWords, a program of selling ads based on spe-
cific keywords, in 2000.31 AdWords took its current payment-per-
23. As Professor Beqjamin Edelman has pointed out, the label "Ads" is so small that it
almost fits inside the "O" in the Google masthead. A Closer Look at Google 's Advertisement
Labels, BENEDELMAN.ORG (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.benedelman.org/adlabeling/
google-nov2010.html.
24. We describe the keyword auction in greater detail infra Part II.C.
25. Google is increasingly trying to customize its results, so the reference to "algorith-
mic" search is an oversimplification. For an alternative formulation of Google's search
methodology, see Our Search: Google Technology, GOOGLE (Apr. 1, 2002),
http://www.google.com/onceuponatime/technology/pigeonrank.html.
26. Beqjamin Edelman & Duncan J. Gilchrist, Advertising Disclosures: Measuring La-
beling Alternatives in Internet Search Engines 6, 14 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No.
11-048, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1706121.
27. Id.
28. Barry Schwartz, Google Does Away with "Sponsored Links" Label, Now Ads Are
Labeled "Ads, " SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Nov. 5, 2010, 3:06 PM), http://
searchengineland.com/google-does-away-with-sponsored-links-label-now-ads-are-labeled-
ads-54956 [hereinafter Schwartz, Google Does Away iwith "Sponsored Links"].
29. Edelman & Gilchrist, supra note 26, at 6.
30. See Hippsley, supra note 21.




click form in 2002.32 In 2004, Google eliminated many restrictions on
the use of trademarks as keywords. 33 We discuss below the circum-
stances under which trademarks may be included in ad text.
Individuals and entities bid to have their ad appear when specified
keywords are used as search terms.34 Whether a particular ad appears
depends on various factors, including the details of the search query,
the amount that is bid, past performance of the ad in the context of
such searches (i.e., click-through rates), and whether and how the bid
is limited by the bidder.35 For example, bidders can target their ads by
location, time, search device employed, and language.36 When con-
sumers click on an ad, the entity that purchased the keyword in ques-
tion pays Google the amount it bid, irrespective of whether any sale
results.3 7
AdWords and the associated pay-per-click ("PPC") payment
model are responsible for the overwhelming majority of Google's
income and for Google's extraordinary market capitalization. For ex-
ample, in 2010, revenue from advertising totaled $28.2 billion, 96%
of Google's total revenues.38 By 2011, revenue from advertising had
32. Press Release, Google, Google Introduces New Pricing for Popular Self-Service
Online Advertising Program (Feb. 20, 2002), http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/
select.html.
33. Greg Lastowka, Google 's Law, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 1327, 1359-60 (2008). Prior to
2004, Google allowed trademarks to be used as keywords, but would remove such ads if
trademark owners complained. After 2004, Google no longer responded to complaints re-
garding the use of trademarks as keywords, meaning that their use was unrestricted. Id. at
1360.
34. JIM JANSEN, UNDERSTANDING SPONSORED SEARCH: CORE ELEMENTS OF KEYWORD
ADVERTISING 177 (2011); Peter O'Connor, Trademark Infringement in Pay-Per-Click Ad-
vertising, in CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN E-BRANDING 148, 149 (Subir Bandyopadhyay
ed., 2009).
35. See, e.g., Check and Understand Quality Score, GOOGLE, https://support.google.
com/adwords/answer/2454010?hl=en (last visited May 9, 2013); Understanding Ad Posi-
tion, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/adwords/answer/1722122 (last visited May 9,
2013); Actual Cost-Per-Click (CPC), GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/
adwords/answer/6297 (last visited May 9, 2013).
36. Using Keyword Matching Options, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/
answer.py?hl=en&answer=6100&topic=16083&ctx-topic (last visited May 9, 2013) (ex-
plaining how to broaden or narrow keyword matches).
37. See Cost-Per-Click Bidding, supra note 4. Google also has a program that allows bids
based on conversion to actual sales, known as cost-per-acquisition bidding. Cost-Per-
Acquisition (CPA), GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/adwords/answer/2472713 (last
visited May 9, 2013).
38. 2010 Financial Tables, GOOGLE, http://investor.google.com/financial/2010/
tables.html (last visited May 9, 2013).
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climbed to more than $36 billion. 39 Bing and Yahoo use a similar
PPC model.40
Trademarks account for a material share of this advertising reve-
nue. According to an internal Google document, trademarked key-
words accounted for 7% of Google's total keyword revenues in 2004,
even though Google honored requests from trademark owners to disa-
ble the use of trademarks in keywords and ad text for part of that peri-
od.41 In 2009, Google estimated that allowing the use of trademarks in
ad text, which it had previously sharply limited, would result in at
least $100 million in increased annual revenues.42
D. Search Engine Policies Regarding Trademark Usage
Google, Bing, and Yahoo have very detailed policies regarding
trademark usage and infringement. Bing and Yahoo's policies are
identical because of a search alliance agreement between Microsoft
and Yahoo. 43 As of 2009, Google allowed trademarks to be purchased
as keywords in more than 190 countries.44 Because the policies vary
by region, we have broken out our discussion accordingly.
To the extent these search engines police the use of trademarks
which varies based on the jurisdiction and on whether the trademark is
being used as a keyword or in ad text - they do so using an approach
analogous to the "notice and takedown" system through which online
copyright infringement disputes are handled pursuant to the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act.45 Thus, search engines do not actively
39. See Meghan Kelly, 96 Percent of Google s Revenue is Advertising, Who Buys It? (in-
fographic), VENTUREBEAT (Jan. 29, 2012, 4:38 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2012/01/29/
google-advertising.
40. See Bing Ads, BING, http://advertise.bingads.microsoft.com/en-us/bing-ads-how-it-
works?tab=costs&s cid=ussmb_a_product costs (last visited May 9, 2013).
41. Joint Appendix Vol. IX, Tab 41 - Ex 6 - Google Three Ad Policy Changes at 4263,
4265, Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-2007),
available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/appendix/33.
42. Joint Appendix Vol. IX, Tab 41 - Ex. 17 - Email from Baris Gultekin (Google Prod-
uct Manager Director) at 4382-83, Rosetta Stone Ltd., 676 F.3d 144 (No. 10-2007), availa-
ble at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/appendix/55.
43. See Pamela Parker, Bing & Yahoo Align with Google 's Trademark Rules for Search
Ads, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Feb. 15, 2011, 5:15 PM), http://www.searchengineland.com/
bing-yahoo-align-with-googles-trademark-rules-64902; see also Dylan Benton, What Every
PPC Advertiser Needs to Knowi About the Yahoo! Bing Search Alliance, TRIMARK (July 26,
2010), hftp://www.trimarksolutions.com/inside/yahoo-bing-merger/what-every-ppc-
advertiser-needs-to-know-about-the-yahoo-bing-search-alliance.
44. Barry Schwartz, Google AdWords Opens Up Trademarked Bidding To Most Coun-
tries, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (May 5, 2009, 4:34 PM), http://searchengineland.com/google-
adwords-opens-up-trademarked-bidding-to-most-countries- 18628 [hereinafter Schwartz,
AdWords Opens Up Trademarked Bidding]; David Naffziger, Google Modifies Global
AdWords Trademark Policy, BRANDVERITY (May 5, 2009), http://blog.brandverity.com/
228/google-modifies-global-adwords-trademark-policy.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
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police the use of trademarks as keywords, but instead respond to
complaints by trademark owners, and then only when those com-
plaints fall within the boundaries that the search engines have set.46
1. United States
In the United States, all three major search engines allow trade-
marks to be purchased as keywords, and none of the three has a for-
mal policy for investigating or disallowing future purchases in
response to complaints by the trademark owner.47 Google has had this
policy since 2004, when it first allowed trademarks to be sold as key-
words,48 while Bing and Yahoo did not formally announce this policy
until 2011. 49
Prior to 2009, Google did not allow trademarks to be used in ad
text, and removed such ads in response to complaints by the trade-
mark owner.50 Since then, Google has allowed trademarks to appear
in ad text so long as doing so constitutes "fair use" and the advertiser
is an informational site, a reseller, or a seller of components, replace-
ment parts, or compatible products. If a trademark owner complains
about the use of its trademark in ad text, Google will conduct an in-
vestigation to assess compliance with its policies.52 Alternatively, a
company may request that Google prohibit all use of its trademark in
ad text by all advertisers. 53
Like Google, Bing and Yahoo allow trademarks to appear in ad
text so long as doing so constitutes fair use, although Bing and Ya-
46. E.g., AdWords Trademark Policy, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/
adwordspolicy/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=6118 (last visited May 9, 2013) ("If a trade-
mark owner files a complaint with Google about the use of their trademark in Ad Words ads,
Google will investigate and may enforce certain restrictions on the use of that trademark in
Ad Words ads and as keywords.").
47. See AdWords Trademark Policy, supra note 46; Editorial FAQs, BING ADS,
http://advertising.microsoft.com/small-business/support-center/search-advertising/editorial-
faq (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
48. See supra note 33.
49. See Eric Goldman, Microsoft Adopts Google-Style Trademark Policy for Keyword
Advertising, ERIC GOLDMAN TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Feb. 15, 2011, 2:05 PM),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/02/microsoft adopt.htm.
50. See Update to U.S. Ad Text Trademark Policy, GOOGLE INSIDE ADWORDS BLOG
(May 14, 2009, 3:38 PM), http://adwords.blogspot.com/2009/05/update-to-us-ad-text-
trademark-policy.html; see also Eric Goldman, Google Liberalizes US Trademark Policy:
"What, Me Worry?" Part 2, ERIC GOLDMAN TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG, (May 15,
2009, 3:56 PM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/05/google liberali.htm.
51. AdWords Trademark Policy: Resellers, GOOGLE (Feb. 27, 2013),
http://support.google.com/adwordspolicy/bin/answer.py?hl en&answer-145626.
52. Id.
53. AdWords Trademark Policy, supra note 46.
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hoo's definition of fair use is more expansive than that of Google's. 54
Bing and Yahoo's enforcement policy is complaint-driven. 55
2. European Union
Google began selling trademarks as keywords in the United
Kingdom and Ireland in 2008.56 It expanded this policy to other Eu-
ropean countries in 2009, and again in 2010. If a trademark owner
complains, Google will conduct a limited investigation to determine
whether a specific ad in combination with a specific keyword creates
confusion as to the origin of the advertised goods and services. 59 if
Google concludes that the ad and keyword combination is confusing,
it will remove the specific ad causing the confusion. 60
In Europe, Bing and Yahoo have a policy on the use of trade-
marks as keywords only in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and
Ireland.61 In these countries, Bing and Yahoo prohibit the use of a
trademark as a keyword if the advertiser is a competitor of the trade-
mark owner.62 If the advertiser is a noncompeting third party, Bing
and Yahoo explicitly permit the use of a keyword trademark so long
as the advertiser's primary offering is not goods or services that com-
pete with the trademark owner, and the advertiser is either an infor-
mational site or is using the term in a descriptive sense. 63 Bing and
Yahoo also permit the use of a keyword that corresponds to a trade-
mark if the advertiser is selling authentic trademarked goods.64
For ad text, Google's policy in Canada, the United Kingdom, and
Ireland has been identical to its policy in the United States since
54. Fair uses are defined by Bing and Yahoo as: (1) use by a reseller of authentic goods
or services, (2) use by an informational website about goods or services represented by the
trademark, (3) descriptive use, i.e., ordinary dictionary uses of a term, and (4) uses for com-
parative advertising so long as the advertising is supported by independent research. See
Intellectual Property Guidelines, BING ADS, http://advertising.microsoft.com/small-
business/support-center/search-advertising/intellectual-property-guidelines (last visited May
9,2013).
55. See id.
56. Schwartz, AdWords Opens Up Trademarked Bidding, supra note 44; Kevin May,
Travel Brands Unite with Other Retailers in Legal Threat Against Google, TRAVOLUTION
(May 23, 2008), http://www.travolution.co.uk/articles/2008/05/23/1436/travel-brands-unite-
with-other-retailers-in-legal-threat-against.html.
57. See generally AdWords Trademark Policy, supra note 46.
58. See Eric Goldman, Google Liberalizes Its European Trademark Policy, ERIC
GOLDMAN TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Aug. 6, 2010, 10:41 AM),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/08/google liberali 1.htm.
59. AdWords Trademark Policy, supra note 46.
60. See id.






2010.65 In the rest of the European Union, Google restricts the use of
trademarks in ad text.66 If a trademark owner files a complaint,
Google will investigate, and may disapprove future use of that ad. 67
As with trademarks as keywords, Bing and Yahoo only have for-
mal policies for ad text in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Ire-
land.68 The policy is similar to that in the United States, but more
restrictive, since the trademark may only be used in a descriptive
sense or to advertise informational sites.69 Thus, the website's princi-
pal offering must not be goods or services competitive with those of
the trademark owner.
3. Other Regions
Google prohibits the use of trademarks as keywords in Australia,
Brazil, China, Hong Kong, New Zealand, South Korea, Macau, and
Taiwan.70 However, a trademark owner must file a complaint before
Google will disallow future use of that ad.71 Google's review of the
complaint is limited to determining whether the complainant's pro-
tected trademark has been purchased as a keyword. 72
Google generally restricts the use of trademarks in ad text in all
other regions. 73 Google does not proactively prevent the use of trade-
marks in ad text, but it will investigate once a trademark owner files a
complaint with Google. If an advertiser is found to be using a trade-
mark in ad text, Google will disapprove future use of that ad. 74
In Singapore, Bing and Yahoo's keyword policy and policy to-
ward the use of trademarks in ad text mirrors its policies for the Unit-
ed Kingdom, France, Italy, and Ireland. Bing and Yahoo have no
other country-specific policies.
65. Update to Canadian, UK and Ireland Ad Text Trademark Policy, GOOGLE INSIDE
ADWORDS BLOG (Aug. 4, 2010, 2:00 AM), http://adwords.blogspot.com/2010/08/update-to-
canadian-uk-and-ireland-ad.html; see also Goldman, supra note 58.
66. This policy also applies to countries belonging to the European Free Trade Area. In
these regions, Google does allow the use of a term in ad text corresponding to a trademark if
the term is being used descriptively or generically, such as when the term is not being used
as a trademark. See AdWords Trademark Policy, supra note 46.
67. See id.
68. See Intellectual Property Guidelines, supra note 54.
69. Id.
70. AdWords Trademark Policy, supra note 46.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See AdWords Trademark Policy, supra note 46.
74. See id.
75. Intellectual Property Guidelines, supra note 54.
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III. SEARCH CONTROVERSIES OVER TRADEMARKED
KEYWORDS
As detailed below, the sale and purchase of trademarks as key-
words has given rise to multiple lawsuits, both domestically and inter-
nationally.76 In the United States, lawsuits have been framed around
the issue of whether such transactions give rise to actionable confu-
sion under trademark law. These disputes have also given rise to a
massive outpouring of academic scholarship. Part III.A reviews the
case law, and Part JJJ.B reviews the academic scholarship. Part III.C
analyzes the surveys of consumer confusion that private litigants have
provided in connection with the litigation described in Part III.A.
A. Case Law
1. Overview
In the United States, no federal statute explicitly prohibits the use
of trademarks as search engine keywords. Trademark owners have
accordingly turned to existing doctrines in trademark law for a poten-
tial remedy. There are two main doctrinal frameworks through which
these cases may be viewed: (1) the likelihood of confusion (i.e., tradi-
tional trademark infringement analysis); or (2) the dilution cause of
action. However, since at least 2006, dilution law in the United States
has clearly been limited to cases of blurring or tarnishment, neither of
which readily applies to most keyword cases.
The paradigmatic example of blurring is when a company uses a
close facsimile to a famous mark, like Google, for a wholly unrelated
76. See infra Part II.A.
77. State statutory and common law also does not generally give rise to a cause of action
for misappropriation in these circumstances. Interestingly, several states have right of pub-
licity statutes that generally make it illegal to misappropriate another person's name or
likeness - irrespective of whether such acts cause consumer confusion as to source, spon-
sorship, or affiliation. In this respect, right of publicity law is much closer to a general law
of misappropriation than is trademark law. We are only aware of one case where someone
has brought a keyword case against a competitor or a search engine based on a right of
publicity claim. See Habush v. Cannon, 828 N.W.2d 876, 882-84 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013)
(finding that Cannon, a personal injury lawyer, was not in violation of Wisconsin's right of
privacy law when he purchased the name of fellow personal injury lawyer Habush as a
keyword).
One of us (Franklyn) was retained as an expert by the defense in this case and provided a
declaration relating to the trademark law implications of Cannon's conduct. The McCarthy
Institute is currently conducting an empirical study of the frequency with which celebrity
names are purchased as keywords.
78. See, e.g., Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff d
in part, remanded in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010); Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc.,
730 F.Supp.2d 531, 550-53 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated in part, 676 F.3d 144, 167 73 (4th
Cir. 2012) (vacating dilution holding).
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type of goods or services, like Googli Pancakes. In such a case,
Google may be able to prove that consumers "think of' Google when
hearing or seeing the Googli Pancakes brand name. As a result, the
Google mark is commercially diminished as a unique and strong
brand identifier, because it is now associated with multiple sources in
the minds of consumers. 79 If the pancakes taste bad, or are advertised
with pornographic or violent images, Google may also have a tar-
nishment claim, again assuming consumers actually think of Google
when they hear or see ads for Googli Pancakes. Dilution by blurring
or tarnishment however, is specifically limited to nationally famous
trademarks, and it was designed for cases in which a third party uses
a famous mark, or close facsimile thereof, on goods or services that
are different than the oods or services upon which the famous mark
owner is using them. But, most of the litigation involving trade-
marks as search engine keywords features competitors who are selling
similar goods to those bearing the trademark, which is quite different
than the typical dilution by blurring or by tarnishment cause of action.
Not surprisingly, trademark owners have accordingly framed the
dispute around traditional likelihood of consumer confusion trade-
mark infringement, which turns on whether there is a likelihood of
confusion as to "affiliation, sponsorship, or association.,,82 To estab-
lish liability, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's use of a
trademark leads to confusion as to source (i.e., some consumers think
79. See Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff'd in
part, remanded in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Trademark dilution claims usually
arise where a defendant has used the plaintiffs trademark to directly identify a different
product of the defendant" and such use "may 'dilute' or weaken the ability of [plaintiffs]
famous mark to 'clearly identify and distinguish only one source"') (citing 4 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:67 (4th ed.
2012)).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). In determining whether a mark has the requisite fame,
courts may consider: "(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and
publicity of the mark . . .. (ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods
or services offered under the mark. (iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark. (iv)
Whether the mark [is] registered. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006).
81. See, e.g., Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in America, 481 F.2d 445, 450 (5th Cir.
1973) ("Dilution is a concept most applicable where a subsequent user uses the trademark of
a prior user for a product so dissimilar from the product of the prior user that there is no
likelihood of confusion of the products or sources . . . ."). Importantly, the Lanham Act
makes clear that dilution is actionable "regardless of the presence or absence of actual or
likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury." See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)
(2006); see also Tiffany, 576 F.Supp.2d at 524.
82. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 23:1 (4th ed. 2012) [hereinafter 4 MCCARTHY]. Trademark owners have also sought to
raise awareness among consumers about the practice of third parties using brand names they
are not affiliated with or authorized to use. See Kate Kaye, Alliance ofSearch Advertisers
Has Familiar Ring, CLICKZ (Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.clickz.com/clickz/news/
1703461/alliance-search-advertisers-has-familiar-ring ("The Alliance Against Bait and
Click (AABC) includes companies and individuals whose names have become synonymous
with the fight against the use of trademarked terms to target online ads . . . .").
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the defendant's goods actually are those of the plaintiff), sponsorship
(i.e., that plaintiff has endorsed the defendant's goods), or affiliation
(i.e., that the plaintiff and defendant are legally related entities). 83
Once likelihood of confusion is established, harm is usually pre-
sumed, and plaintiffs may obtain injunctive relief and provable dam-
ages, including the profits derived by the defendant from infringing
sales. 84
Courts have developed complex multifactor tests to assess wheth-
er there is a likelihood of confusion. The factors include: (1) the
strength of the mark, (2) proximity of the goods, (3) similarity of the
marks, (4) evidence of actual confusion, (5) marketing channels used,
(6) type of goods and degree of purchaser care, (7) defendant's intent,
and (8) likelihood of expansion of product lines. To be sure, the cir-
cuit courts of appeals vary as to how many factors are included, and
there is some evidence that district courts focus on only a few factors
in deciding such cases.86 Regardless, courts are more likely to find
confusion if the marks are highly similar, the goods or services are
alike, the defendant chose to use a similar mark in order to "free ride"
on the goodwill of the plaintiff, the relevant consuming public is un-
sophisticated, and the parties sell to the same pool of customers.87
Courts have had difficulty applying this framework to keyword
cases, and have responded by emphasizing the importance of some
factors, and ignoring others. Some courts have focused on "diver-
sion," and imposed liability on that basis alone.89 Other courts have
said that mere diversion does not constitute trademark infringement; it
must be shown that a searcher who was looking for X and was divert-
ed to Y's website went there (at least initially) because she thought Y
was affiliated with or sponsored by X. 9 0
If mere diversion is insufficient, how much confusion must be
shown to warrant relief? The plaintiff must show that an "apprecia-
ble" (i.e., more than trivial but less than substantial) number of rele-
vant consumers are likely to be confused if defendant's activities are
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006) (prohibiting infringement of registered marks); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a) (2006) (prohibiting infringement of unregistered marks).
84. 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 30:47 (4th ed. 2012).
85. E.g., AMF, Inc. v. Sleekeraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
86. See generally Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trade-
mark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 1581 (2006).
87. See generally AMF, Inc., 599 F.2d 341.
88. See, e.g., Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137,
1148 (9th Cir. 2011); Hearts on Fire Co. v. Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 274, 280 (D.
Mass. 2009). The Fourth Circuit recently emphasized the importance of focusing on the
ultimate issue of confusion when applying the multi-factor test. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v.
Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152-53 (4th Cir. 2012).
89. E.g., Storus Corp. v. Aroa Mktg., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d 1032, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
90. Hearts on Fire Co., 603 F. Supp. 2d at 283, 286.
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allowed to proceed.91 Litigants may, but need not, offer survey evi-
dence to prove or disprove the likelihood of confusion.92 Courts have
been unimpressed if the survey evidence shows that 10-15% of re-
spondents are confused, but higher figures have been associated with
greater success.93
2. Judicial Assumptions
In deciding keyword cases, judges have routinely made assump-
tions, based on casual or "armchair" empiricism, that have substantial-
ly affected the outcomes of the cases. We have identified six specific
areas in which judges have made such assumptions: (1) consumer
goals and expectations when trademarks are used as search terms,
(2) advertiser or search engine intent when purchasing or selling a
trademarked keyword, (3) consumer knowledge of and attentiveness
to search page architecture and labeling of results, (4) the significance
of the trademark appearing in the ad text, (5) the likelihood of diver-
sion, and (6) the likelihood of confusion. We analyze each assumption
in turn.
A. Consumer Goals and Expectations
Understanding consumer goals and expectations is critical in de-
termining whether diversion is likely to occur, and is important but
less critical in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion.
Consider two types of consumers: Consumer #1 has "narrow" prefer-
ences and Consumer #2 has "broad" preferences. When Consumer #1
types trademark X into a search engine, she is only looking for prod-
ucts bearing that trademark and expects to see such products and no
others. Consumer #2, on the other hand, focuses on the product cate-
gory rather than the specific brand. When Consumer #2 types trade-
mark X into a search engine, she is using it as a generic proxy term to
describe a category of goods. She could have equally well typed in
trademarks Y and Z, which compete with products bearing trademark
X. Consumer #2 welcomes information on products bearing trade-
marks Y and Z, and would be disappointed if her search engine pro-
vided only information on products bearing trademark X.94
91. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 82, § 23:2.
92. 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 32:195 (4th ed. 2012).
93. See Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 467 (4th Cir. 1996) (conclud-
ing that below 10% confusion is usually insufficient, but that even half of a claimed 30-
40 % figure would be significant); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 82, § 23:2.
94. See, e.g., Memorandum of Amicus Curiae Pub. Citizen at 9-10, Gov't Emps. Ins. Co.
v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004) (No. 1:04cv507), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF4FO.pdf The briefnoted:
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It is certainly plausible, if not extremely likely, that Consumer #1
can be diverted by paid links for products bearing trademarks Y and
Z. Conversely, it is implausible, if not impossible, for Consumer #2 to
be diverted when presented with the same search output, since her
original goals encompassed products bearing all three trademarks.
Matters get even more complex if consumers expect, based on
past online and offline experiences, that a search for products bearing
trademark X will also result in information for products bearing
trademarks Y and Z. The case for diversion of Consumer #1 is weaker
if she now expects, based on past experiences, to receive information
on trademarks Y and Z, irrespective of the fact that she is only search-
ing for products bearing trademark X. Stated more directly, for a
meaningful claim of diversion to arise, the consumer must have both a
fixed destination in mind, such as the specific branded product that
she used as a search term, and must not have expected to encounter
other branded products along the way. The relative proportion of con-
sumers who have broad versus narrow preferences and/or expecta-
tions complicates matters further.
Consumer goals and expectations map less neatly onto the risk of
confusion than they do onto the risk of diversion. However, it is plau-
sible to assume that the likelihood of confusion is somewhat greater
among those who are only interested in and expect to receive infor-
mation about the branded good they searched for, while the likelihood
of confusion is somewhat lessened among those who have more ex-
pansive goals or expectations. Thus, all else being equal, the distribu-
tion of goals and expectations within a population should have a
material impact on the frequency with which courts find confusion.
Strikingly, rather than wrestle with these issues or demand that
the parties provide direct evidence on these points, many judges have
simply assumed that when a trademark is used as a search term, the
consumer is interested only in goods bearing that trademark, or in the
company that owns that trademark. For example, in Network Automa-
tion, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc., the Ninth Circuit stated
that consumers conducting a search with the trademark in question
The fundamental flaw in GEICO's submission is its apparent assump-
tion that any member of the public who uses a search engine to con-
duct a search using the term "GEICO" must necessarily be searching
for GEICO's official site, and only for that site, and hence is likely to
experience confusion about whether all of the ensuing search results
are linked to GEICO's own site . ... But the mere fact that the user is
looking for information that has some bearing on a trademarked
word, such as "GEICO," does not necessarily mean that the user
wants to know only who owns the trademark and what the owner
wants to convey[.]
Id. If anything, our example of "broad preferences" is too narrow; Public Citizen
lists more than a dozen reasons why a consumer might use a trademark as a
search term, few of which are contained within our definition of "broad prefer-
ences." Id. at 10-11.
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(Activebatch) "are presumably looking for [the] specific product, and
not a category of goods."95 The same assumption was made by the
district courts in Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc.,96 Storus Corp. v.
Aroa Marketing,97 Harry J Binder v. Disability Group, Inc.,98 and
Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield.99 In Hearts on Fire Co. v. Blue Nile,
Inc., the court did not go quite as far, but still noted that a factor to be
considered in the confusion analysis was "the specific context of a
consumer who has deliberately searched for trademarked diamonds
only to find a sponsored link to a diamond retailer . . . 100 This
framing, and the underlying assumption on which it is based, makes it
considerably easier for courts to conclude that actionable diversion
has taken place, or that there is a likelihood of confusion. 10 1
Ultimately, the distribution of goals and expectations among con-
sumers is an empirical question. Perhaps the stylized categories we
have presented accurately capture what is going on. Alternatively,
more categories may need to be employed, or it may be useful to think
about consumer goals and expectations arrayed along a spectrum.
Consumers may also switch categories depending on what prod-
uct or service they are searching for. For example, consumers may use
trademarks as a generic proxy term for some categories of goods and
services (e.g., Hertz for rental cars), but use other trademarks to
search for specific products (e.g., Macbook for laptops made by Ap-
ple). Regardless, judges should not simply assume that consumers
have homogenous goals and expectations, and are all equally suscep-
tible to diversion or confusion.
B. Intent
In trademark infringement cases, courts have inferred "bad" intent
when defendants knowingly use a mark that is similar or identical to
that of a competitor. This approach has been transferred wholesale to
the online world, with no consideration given to whether a different
approach might be appropriate for keyword searches. For instance, in
95. 638 F.3d 1137, 1154 (9th Cir. 2011).
96. See 676 F.3d 144, 158-59 (4th Cir. 2012).
97. See 87 U.S.P.Q.2d 1032, 1037 (N.D. Cal 2008).
98. See 772 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1176-77 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
99. See 436 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006).
100. See 603 F.Supp.2d 274, 289 (D. Mass. 2009).
101. Others have been more circumspect. See, e.g., Mark A. Rosso & Bernard J. Jansen,
Brand Names as Keywords in Sponsored Search Advertising, 27 COMM. OF THE ASS'N FOR
INFO. SYS. 81, 91 (2010) ("Certainly, it is difficult in general to infer searcher intent based
strictly on a query's search terms." (citing Daniel M. Russell et al., Task Behaviors During
Web Search: The Difficulty of Assigning Labels, 2009 PROC. OF THE 42ND HAW. INT'L
CONF. ON SYS. SCL 1, 4, available at http://origin-www.computer.org/csdl/proceedings/
hicss/2009/3450/00/03-03-05.pdf)).
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both Binder and Storus, the district courts treated the fact that another
entity's trademark had been purchased as a keyword as dispositive on
the issue of intent.102 In Rosetta Stone, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that a rational jury could infer bad intent from Google's financial in-
centive to sell trademarks as keywords, as well as Google's
knowledge, based on its internal research, that doing so significantly
heightened the risk of consumer confusion.103 But if consumers rou-
tinely use trademarks as generic proxy terms, to refer to broad classes
of goods, it does not make sense to automatically infer bad intent
when advertisers use a trademark as a keyword.
C. Consumer Knowledge of and Attentiveness to Search Page Archi-
tecture and Labels
Courts routinely assume that consumers are knowledgeable about
and rely upon search page architecture and the labels on paid links.
Thus, in Playboy v. Netscape, the Ninth Circuit found a potential for
initial interest confusion when consumers saw banner advertisements
that were "confusingly labeled or not labeled at all." 104 The Ninth
Circuit expressly observed that clear labeling "might eliminate the
likelihood of initial interest confusion that exists in this case." 105 In
Network Automation, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the importance of
search page architecture and labeling:
[E]ven if [the Defendant] has not clearly identified it-
self in the text of its ads, Google and Bing have parti-
tioned their search results pages so that the
advertisements appear in separately labeled sections for
"sponsored" links. The labeling and appearance of the
advertisements as they appear on the results page ...
must be considered as a whole. 106
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the "labeling and ap-
pearance of the advertisements and the surrounding context on the
screen displaying the results page" was one of the most important fac-
tors in a trademark keyword case.107 Similarly, in Rosetta Stone, the
district court observed that confusion was unlikely because consumers
102. See Harry J. Binder, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 1181-82; Storus Corp., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1037.
103. See 676 F.3d at 155-56. Unfortunately, although the opinion references the prior re-
search, the actual studies remain under seal. The authors are in the process of moving to
unseal this portion of the record.
104. 354 F.3d 1020, 1023, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004).
105. Id. at 1030 n.43.




"are able to distinguish between the Sponsored Links and organic re-
sults displayed on Google's search results page." 10 8
These assumptions are material: consumers who understand
search page architecture and can differentiate paid ads from unpaid
search results are more likely to understand that ads may come from
sources other than the trademark owner, even if they used the trade-
mark as a search term in the first place. Conversely, if consumers do
not understand search page architecture and the fact that some links
are paid ads, they are arguably more prone to confusion. Because the
degree of consumer knowledge about search page architecture and the
fact that some links are paid ads is ultimately an empirical question,
the assumption that consumers are knowledgeable about such matters
weights the dice heavily against a finding of confusion.
D. Appearance ofPlaintiff's Mark in Defendant's Ad Text
Courts have placed considerable weight on whether the ad head-
ing or text includes the trademark in question, reasoning that the risk
of confusion is far higher if the trademark actually appears in the ad
itself.109 Accordingly, courts have been more willing to infer confu-
sion if the ad text includes the trademark in question.110 Thus, in the
GEICO trial, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs trademark in-
fringement claims against Google for ad text that did not include the
GEICO trademark, while finding that GEICO had demonstrated a
likelihood of confusion, and therefore a violation of the Lanham Act,
for sponsored links that use GEICO's trademarks in their headings or
text. As noted earlier, it is ultimately an empirical question whether
the inclusion of the trademark in ad text increases the risk of confu-
sion, but the judicial assumption that it does means that advertisers
can dramatically lower the likelihood that courts will find confusion
simply by omitting the trademark from ad text.
E. Likelihood ofDiversion
Some courts have found in favor of the trademark owner when
there was evidence of consumer diversion, but not much, if any, evi-
dence of a likelihood of consumer confusion.112 In these cases, courts
108. 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 545 (E.D. Va. 2010). The Fourth Circuit disagreed, finding
enough evidence of confusion regarding sponsored links to send the case to the jury. Rosetta
Stone Ltd., 676 F.3d at 144.
109. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1841, 1847-48 (E.D. Va.
2005).
110. Rosetta Stone Ltd., 676 F.3d at 156.
111. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1847-48.
112. E.g., Storus Corp. v. Aroa Mktg., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d 1032, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
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have effectively assumed that diversion is a type of harm for which
trademark law provides a remedy, virtually independent of evidence
of consumer confusion. It is not entirely clear whether courts that take
this step actually believe that diversion is legally equivalent to confu-
sion, or are simply seeking to prohibit conduct they believe is norma-
tively undesirable by stretching the existing doctrinal framework.
F. Likelihood of Confusion
The multifactor test described above in Part III.A.1 was devel-
oped to resolve disputes involving trademark infringement in the of-
fline world. However, courts have used the same framework to
resolve search engine keyword cases, discarding the factors that do
not fit, and then applying the remaining factors.113 Insufficient con-
sideration has been given to whether the analysis should involve dif-
ferent criteria, tied to the realities of search behavior on the Internet.
Courts have simply assumed that the same set of factors will work to
cost-effectively identify confusion as to source, sponsorship, or affili-
ation on the Internet. But this approach means that factors that were
developed to analyze likelihood of confusion in an offline world have
effectively become dispositive endpoints in their own right, even
when they are ill-suited to an online search environment.
B. Academic Scholarship
More than fifty law review articles and student notes have been
written about trademark infringement in the context of keyword ad-
vertising.114 We cannot begin to count the number of presentations
made by practicing lawyers at CLE sessions on the subject.
Much of this work focuses on the "trademark use" controversy
hotly debated at the outset of keyword litigation. As that issue has
waned in significance, articles and notes have increasingly focused on
whether the initial interest confusion doctrine fits the online world. 116
113. See, e.g., Rosetta Stone Ltd., 676 F.3d at 153-54.
114. A list of the articles is available from the authors on request.
115. The debate was over whether the defendant-advertisers and search engines were us-
ing plaintiffs mark as a trademark. E.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademark
and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REv. 777 (2004). That controver-
sy has largely subsided, with virtually all courts holding that the sale of trademarks as key-
words may be actionable, as long as infringement in the form of confusion or dilution is
shown. See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2009).
116. See, e.g., Daniel C. Glazer & Dev R. Dhamija, Revisiting Initial Interest Confusion
on the Internet, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 952, 953 (2005); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Rele-
vancy in Internet Trademark Law,, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 509, 565 (2005) [hereinafter Gold-
man, Deregulating Relevancy] (arguing that initial interest confusion doctrine is "predicated
on multiple mistaken and empirically unsupported assumptions about searcher behavior");
David M. Klein & Daniel C. Glazer, Reconsidering Initial Interest Confusion on the Inter-
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Strikingly, although there is a veritable mountain of materials on
the legal issues raised by the use of trademarks as keywords, we have
found very little empirical work on the subject, and none of it has
been published in the law reviews. 1 17 O'Connor studied the use of
trademarks as keywords for a sample of ninety hotels in Europe, Asia,
and the United States, and found that "abuse is rampant," with ads for
third-party websites appearing in a clear majority of searches. 118 Ros-
so and Jansen analyzed the frequency at which third parties' ads ap-
peared in response to searches for 100 prominent trademarks and
found that although such situations were common, occurring in 64-
93% of searches, competitors accounted for only 2.7-6.4% of "piggy-
backing" ads. 119 Further, very few of the piggybacking ads placed by
competitors used the trademark in ad text.120 Rosso and Jansen con-
cluded that "competitive piggybacking does not appear to be a decep-
tive or widespread phenomenon." 12 1
Several studies focused on other issues related to the use of
trademarks as keywords. Chiou and Tucker studied the impact of in-
cluding trademarks in ad text for hotel reservations and found that
such advertising actually increased the demand for reservations from
the hotel's own website - consumers clicked less often on paid ads,
and more often on the organic link for the hotel itself.122 They sug-
gested that such "channel substitution" resulted from the fact that paid
ads could no longer effectively differentiate themselves once all sites
net, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1035, 1035 (2003); Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confu-
sion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 105, 169 (2005);
cf Eric Goldman, Brand Spillovers, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 381, 397 (2009) (arguing that
redirection of consumers to competing brands is widely accepted by courts in an offline
retail context).
117. One article, reporting the results of a survey, appeared in the Trademark Reporter.
Because the survey was conducted on behalf of one of the parties in a lawsuit involving the
purchase of trademarks as keywords, we address it below. See Jacoby & Saleman, infra note
132.
118. Peter O'Connor, An Analysis of Hotel Trademark Abuse in Pay-Per-Click Search
Advertising, in INFORMATION & COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES IN TOuRISM 2007
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN LJUBLJANA, SLOVENIA 377, 377,
385 (2007) (finding that ads appeared in the vast majority of searches and that third parties
accounted for the vast majority of the ads).
119. Rosso & Jansen, supra note 101, at 88. The most common forms of piggybacking
are resellers' promotion of the brand or other functions that assist in selling the product,
such as coupons or free samples. Such promotional piggybacking accounted for 55- 78% of
ads, depending on the search engine. Id Orthogonal piggybacking, the results of which
usually included informational websites about the brand or the underlying company, ac-
counted for 16-42% of ads, depending on the search engine. Id.
120. Id. at 89 ("[T]he use of trademarked terms by competitors is extremely low. As
shown in Table 6, those six competitive piggybacking ad occurrences are the result of just
two ads. . . .").
121. Id. at 81.
122. Lesley Chiou & Catherine Tucker, How Does the Use of Trademarks by Third-Party
Sellers Affect Online Search?, 31 MARKETING SCI. 819, 819 (2012).
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included the trademark.123 In an unpublished doctoral dissertation,
Shin developed a model for predicting when companies will and will
not purchase their own trademarks as keywords.124 Edelman and
Gilchrist studied the impact of label text on click-throughs, and found
that the use of "Paid Advertisements" resulted in a 25-27% lower
click-through rate than "Sponsored links" or "Ads," respectively. 125
Somewhat dated surveys also make it clear that consumers are not
particularly familiar with the differences between paid and unpaid
links, but distrust the former. In a 2004 survey, 62% of respondents
were unaware that search engines provided both paid and unpaid
search results.126 Among those who were aware of the distinction,
fewer than half (47%) said they could always tell which results were
paid.127 A 2003 survey found that respondents took little notice of
labels and search page architecture, but they thought the term "spon-
sored" was vague and confusing.128 Finally, a survey reported in a
2006 article found considerable suspicion about sponsored links, and
"low expectation[s]" about the value of such results.129 Not surpris-
ingly, respondents reported that they preferred to click on unpaid
links.130
C. Private Litigation - Consumer Surveys
Private litigation involving claims of trademark infringement has
generated multiple surveys of consumer confusion. Table 1 specifies
the rate of confusion quantified by thirteen expert reports offered in
123. Id. at 827; see also Lesley Chiou, Occidental Coll., & Catherine Tucker, MIT Sloan,
How Does the Use of Trademarks by Third-Party Sellers Affect Online Search?, Address at
the Sixth Bi-Annual Conference on the Economics of Intellectual Property, Software and
the Internet (Jan. 13, 2011), available at http://idei.fr/doc/conf/sic/slides_2011/
tuckerchiousslides.pdf
124. See generally Woo Choel Shin, The Company That You Keep: When to Buy a
Competitor's Keyword (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University), available
at http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/2486/DShinWoo%
20Choel a 201005.pdf. Mark Rosso graciously pointed us to this dissertation.
125. Edelman & Gilchrist, supra note 26, at 10.
126. DEBORAH FALLOWS, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, SEARCH ENGINE USERS:
INTERNET SEARCHERS ARE CONFIDENT, SATISFIED AND TRUSTING - BUT THEY ARE ALSO
UNAWARE AND NAIVE 17 (2005), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/
Reports/2005/PIP Searchengine users.pdfpdf
127. Id. at ii.
128. LESLIE MARABLE, CONSUMER WEBWATCH, FALSE ORACLES: CONSUMER
REACTION TO LEARNING THE TRUTH ABOUT How SEARCH ENGINES WORK 16, 26 (June 30,
2003), available at http://www.consumerwebwatch.org/pdfs/false-oracles.pdf
129. See, e.g., Bernard J. Jansen & Marc Resnick, An Examination of Searcher's Percep-
tions of Nonsponsored and Sponsored Links During Ecommerce Web Searching, 57 J. AM.
SOC'Y FOR INFO. SC. & TECH. 1949, 1959 (2006).
130. Id. at 1958-59. This preference may help explain the emergence of software that en-
ables Internet searchers to block virtually all paid links and ads. Noam Cohen, Whiting Out
the Ads, but at What Cost?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2007, at C3.
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eleven different cases. For eight of these surveys, we had the full ex-
pert report, while for the other five surveys, we rely on the description
of the survey in the court's opinion or in other materials.
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Table 1: Surveys Presented in Litigation
Case Name Presented By Rate of Confusion
American Airlines1 3 1  Defendant 0-2%
GEIC 1 3 2  Defendant < 10%
1-800 Contacts, Inc.13 3  Plaintiff 12-38%
Rosetta Stone1 34  Plaintiff 17%
American Airlines1 3 5  Plaintiff 20-32%
CNG Financial1 36  Plaintiff 21-38%
American Blind1 37  Plaintiff 29%
FPX1 8  Plaintiff 42-71%
Mary Kay139  Plaintiff 45%
Trafficschool coM1 40  Plaintiff approx. 50-96%
Fair Isaac1 4 1  Plaintiff > 65%
GEICO14 2  Plaintiff 68-70%
Harry Binder1 43 Plaintiff 88-94% 1
Sample size unknown for Trafficschooltcom and GEICO plaintiff results.
Sample for other reports ranged from 271 (GEICO defendant results) to
1055 (1-800 Contacts, Inc.), with the exception of Harry Binder (17).
131. Expert Report of Dr. Itamar Simonson at 6, Am. Airlines v. Google, Inc. (N.D. Tex.
May 21, 2008) (No. 4-07-CV-487-A).
132. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1841 (E.D. Va.
2004). Defendant's survey was described in an article co-authored by defendant's survey
expert. Jacob Jacoby & Mark Sableman, Keyword-Based Advertising: Filling in the Factual
Voids, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 681, 749 (2007). The survey's finding of below 10% confusion
applies only to confusion for the reasons alleged by the plaintiff. Id. at 743.
133. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-591 CW, 2010 WL 5186393, at
*3-4 (C.D. Utah Dec. 15, 2010).
134. Expert Report of Dr. Kent D. Van Liere at 12, Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc.,
730 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2010) (No. 1: 09cv736 (GBL/TCB)), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/appendix/99.
135. Expert Report of Dr. Kent D. Van Liere, Ph.D. at 18, Am. Airlines v. Google, Inc.
(N.D. Tex. May 22, 2008) (No. 4-07-CV-487-A).
136. Expert Report of Michael B. Mazis, Ph.D. at 11-13, CNG Fin. Corp. v. Google, Inc.
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 5, 2006) (No. 1:06cv040).
137. A Study to Determine Whether Google's Sale of Key Word Advertising, in the
Form of Sponsored Links, for the Entry "American Blinds" Misleads Consumers Seeking to
Order Products On-Line from American Blinds at 7, Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper
Factory, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007) (No. C 03-5340 JF (RS)), 2007 WL 1159950, at *8.
138. An Empirical Analysis of Consumers' Understanding of the Relationship Between
Sponsored Links and "Searched For" Links on Internet Search Engines at 5, FPX, LLC v.
Google, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 543 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (No. 2:09-cv-00142-DF) [hereinafter An
Empirical Analysis].
139. Expert Report of Dr. Kent Van Liere, Ph.D. at 13, Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, 601 F.
Supp. 2d 839, 849 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 3:08-cv-00776-G-BD).
140. TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. eDriver, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1078-79 (C.D. Cal.
2008), affd in part, rev d in part, 653 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2011).
141. Research Report of James T. Berger at 32-34, Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. So-
lutions, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 734 (D. Minn. 2009) (No. 0:06-cv-04112-ADM-JSM).
142. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1841, 1846 (E.D. Va. 2005).
143. See Harry J. Binder v. Disability Grp., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal.
2011).
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Not surprisingly, defendants' experts invariably find low levels of
confusion, while plaintiffs' experts invariably find higher levels of
confusion.144 In two cases, we have reports on the rate of confusion
found by experts for each side. In American Airlines, the defense ex-
pert found a rate of confusion of 0-2%, while the plaintiffs expert
found a rate of confusion of 20-32%. 145 In GEICO, the defense ex-
pert found a rate of confusion of < 10%, while the plaintiffs expert
found a rate of confusion of 68-70%. 146
Finally, the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Rosetta Stone references
research conducted by Google in 2004.147 Unfortunately, the actual
study remains under seal, but the opinion states that Google found that
the inclusion of a trademark in ad text, whether in the title or body,
led to a very high degree of consumer confusion, noting that "94% of
users were confused at least once" during the study. 148
144. George Stigler identified a similar dynamic in antitrust cases:
Consider the problem of defining a market within which the existence
of competition or some form of monopoly is to be determined. The
typical antitrust case is an almost impudent exercise in economic ger-
rymandering. The plaintiff sets the market, at a maximum, as one
state in area and including only aperture-priority SLR cameras selling
between $200 and $250. This might be called J-Shermanizing the
market, after Senator John Sherman. The defendant will in turn insist
that the market is worldwide, and includes not only all cameras, but
also portrait artists and possibly transportation media because a visit
is a substitute for a picture. This might also be called T-Shermanizing
the market, this time after the Senator's brother, General William Te-
cumseh Sherman. Depending on who convinces the judge, the con-
centration ratios will be awesome or trivial, with a large influence on
his verdict.
George J. Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, in THE ECONOMIST AS
PREACHER AND OTHER ESSAYS 38, 51 (1982).
145. Supra notes 131 and 135.
146. Supra notes 132 and 142.
147. This case was settled before trial. Rosetta Stone and Google Settle Trademark Law-
suit, REUTERS (Oct. 31, 2012), hftp://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/31/us-usa-court-
rosettastone-google-idUSBRE89U1GE20121031.
148. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 158 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Google survey). Rosetta Stone's filing Opposition to Google's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment provides further detail on the research conducted by Google:
* Preliminary results "indicate[d] that confusion remains high when
TM's are allowed in the body but not in the ad title. For a user, it
seems to make little difference whether s/he sees a TM in the ad title
or ad body - the likelihood of confusion remains high. This infer-
ence is also supported by qualitative/anecdotal data, i.e., responses by
our subjects to open-ended questions asked at the end of the experi-
ment. This suggests that the only effective TM policy for US/Canada
is: (1) Allow TM usage for keywords (2) Do not allow TM usage in
ad text - title or body." (Ex. 33.)
* "87 .5% of users were confused at least once during Experiment 2,
and 76% of the users were confused at least once during Experiment
4." (Ex. 34.)
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IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
A. Coding Study
As described previously, there have been numerous lawsuits aris-
ing out of the use of trademarks as keywords in Internet searches. But,
little is known about the frequency with which such transactions oc-
cur, let alone who is doing the purchasing. We accordingly performed
a study to determine who was purchasing trademarks as keywords.
Because this study is the focus of another article, we provide only a
brief description of this other study and one of its central findings
here.
We obtained a list of approximately 2500 trademarks from the In-
ternational Trademark Association, and developed a computer pro-
gram to run an Internet search for each trademark through the three
most prominent search engines (Bing, Google, and Yahoo).149 For
each trademark/search engine combination, the program captured a
PDF file of the web page that would have been viewed had one
clicked through each of the first ten paid links. We then developed a
standardized coding protocol for classifying the search output, using
eleven categories, including whether the paid link was for the trade-
mark owner, an entity selling the trademarked goods as well as com-
peting goods, or an entity selling competing goods exclusively.
McCarthy Institute research fellows from the University of San Fran-
cisco coded the first five paid links for each trademark/search engine
combination.150 Table 2 contains details on the coding categories, and
our results, sorted from most to least frequent.
* "Overall very high rate of trademark confusion (30-40% on average
per user) . .. 94% of users were confused at least once during the
study." (Ex. 35.)
Rosetta Stone's Opposition to Google's Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, Rosetta Stone
Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 1:09cv736 (GBL/TCB)), available
at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/appendix/82. The authors have sought to have this
information unsealed - so far without success.
149. A list of the trademarks is available from the authors on request. INTA's current list
of trademarks is searchable online. Trademark Checklist, INT'L TRADEMARK ASS'N,
http://applications.inta.org/apps/trademark checklist (last visited May 9, 2013).
150. As noted previously, we describe this study and the steps we took to ensure inter-
rater reliability in greater detail in a separate article. See David A. Hyman & David Frank-




Table 2: Coding Results
Type of Paid Link % of Paid Links
Vendor of TM products and competing products 27%
Collateral information/sales opportunity vendor151  24%
TM owner 13%
Vendor of TM products only 6%
Vendor of competing products only 6%
Generic use 6%
Other 6%
Vendor of collateral/complementary 5%
goods/services
Collateral information provider 3%
Employment website 2%
Coupon website 2%
Coding Results for 2463 trademarks, totaling 18,733 paid links (3982 for
Google; 5396 for Bing, and 9355 for Yahoo).
As Table 2 indicates, vendors of the trademarked good and com-
peting products account for 27% of paid links; collateral infor-
mation/sales opportunity vendors (who provide a gateway through
which to purchase the trademarked good) account for 24% of paid
links; and the trademark owner accounts for 13% of paid links. Only
6% of paid links are purchased by entities selling exclusively compet-
ing goods. Thus, the overwhelming majority of paid links are unlikely
to give rise to the types of consumer confusion at stake in the lawsuits
that have been brought. Our findings are consistent with those of an
earlier, smaller study of high-profile trademarks. 152
B. Surveys
1. Overview
We now turn to the results of three separate online surveys: two
from 2010 and one from 2012. The authors were responsible for the
specific questions that were asked, and the analysis of the results of
those surveys, although a private firm assisted in the design of two of
the three surveys,153 and another firm was responsible for obtaining
151. A collateral information/sales opportunity vendor would be a site like pricegrab-
ber.com or eBay.
152. Rosso & Jansen, supra note 101, at 93.
153. Hertz Research assisted us in the design of the first two surveys.
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the panel of survey respondents and administering the surveys.154 An
Appendix to this Article summarizes basic demographic information
about those who participated in each of the three surveys, but we ob-
tained a broad cross-section of the population in each survey. All
three surveys had roughly 1000 respondents.
2. Background on Surveys
A. 1st Survey
The first survey was conducted between May 17, 2010, and May
22, 2010. The survey had a total of forty-six questions: thirty-seven
substantive questions and nine demographic questions. It focused on
how consumers searched for information on the Internet, their degree
of knowledge about paid and unpaid search results, and whether they
perceived they had been "diverted" from what they were searching for
by the results they received.
B. 2nd Survey
The second survey was conducted between October 25, 2010, and
November 5, 2010. The second survey had a total of forty-five ques-
tions: thirty-six substantive and nine demographic. It focused on
search page architecture and labels, with a primary focus on the dif-
ference between paid and unpaid search results.
C. 3rd Survey
The third survey was conducted between February 1, 2012, and
February 14, 2012. The third survey had a total of forty-eight ques-
tions: thirty-eight substantive and ten demographic. It focused on
search page architecture and labels, consumer goals and expectations
in using trademarks as search terms, the degree of consumer confu-
sion, and attitudes regarding the fairness of a company purchasing its
competitors' trademarks as keywords.
154. Survey respondents were recruited, and the survey was administered by Survey
Sampling International ("SSI"). SSI maintains a database of individuals willing to partici-
pate in online surveys. They invited individuals from this database to participate in our
survey and paid participants a nominal amount ($5 per survey).
Respondents are recruited from online advertising and affiliate partnerships (through so-
cial media such as blogs and forums) as well as from third party databases. All respondents
indicate they would like to participate in market research and must verify an e-mail address
to be opted into participating. SSI then asks for basic demographic information, including




We break our findings down as follows: (1) consumer knowledge
of search page architecture, (2) adequacy of disclosure of paid links,
(3) consumer goals and expectations when trademarks are used as
search terms, (4) consumer attentiveness to search page architecture
and labeling, (5) consumer propensity to click on paid links,
(6) diversion and confusion, and (7) fairness norms.
A. Consumer Knowledge of Search Page Architecture
As noted previously, assumptions about consumer knowledge of
search page architecture figure prominently in litigation over the use
of trademarks as keywords. In all three surveys, we found consid-
erable variation in consumer knowledge of search page architecture.
When we asked survey respondents whether they were familiar with
how search results are organized, 27% responded that they were very
familiar, 33% responded that they were familiar, while 25% were
somewhat familiar, and 15% were either not very familiar or not at all
familiar.156 Table 3 presents the results when we asked survey re-
spondents more detailed questions about sponsored/paid links, and
whether they knew where paid results appeared on the search page.
Table 3: Consumer knowledge of search page architecture
Yes No Not sure
Aware that search companies are
paid to feature certain sites more 61% 27% 12%
prominently? 157
Know the difference between 42% 31% 27%
sponsored and unsponsored search _
results? 158  36% 42% 22%
Easy to distinguish between paid
and unpaid search results?' 5 9  350 380 270
Know where the paid results usu-
ally appear? 1 6 0  43% 40% 17%
155. See supra Part III.A.2.
156. Survey 2, Question 5.
157. Survey 2, Question 17.
158. We asked this question in both Survey 1 and Survey 2. The upper row is for Survey
1, Question 14, and the lower row is for Survey 2, Question 13.
159. Survey 2, Question 20. In Survey 1, Question 16, we asked survey respondents that
knew the difference between sponsored and unsponsored links whether sponsored links
were clearly designated from those that were not sponsored. 66% answered yes, 14% an-
swered no, and 20% were unsure.
160. Survey 2, Question 21.
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These results indicate that a substantial percentage of survey re-
spondents are unaware of basic facts about search page architecture
and labeling. To probe this issue further, we presented survey re-
spondents with Figure 2, which is a modified version of Figure 1.
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Figure 2: Google Search of "Mercedes," Sections Clearly Labeled
We then asked survey respondents whether particular regions of
Figure 2 were made up of paid or unpaid links. We added a fanciful
control ("links selected by Google's special marketing team") and
also allowed respondents to select "don't know/not sure," and "other."
Obviously, for sections A and B, the correct answer is "paid links,"
while for section C, the correct answer is "unpaid links." Table 4 pre-





Table 4: Source of Links
Section
Panel A A161 B162 C163
Unpaid links 15% 24% 51%
Paid links 46% 38% 16%
Google's special marketing 17% 15% 11%
team
Not sure/Do not know 21% 22% 20%
Other 1% 1% 2%
Panel B: Cumulative Performance
All 3 correct 16%
2 of 3 correct 30%
2 of 3 correct (paid only) 21%
1 of 3 correct 27%
0 of 3 correct 27%
Strikingly, only for section C did more than half of survey re-
spondents answer the question correctly, and then only just. In addi-
tion, between 11% and 17% of survey respondents selected the
fanciful response we included as a control, and 20% or more of survey
respondents did not know or were unsure for all three sections.
If we focus on cumulative correct responses, the results are far
worse. As Table 4, Panel B reflects, only 16% of survey respondents
correctly answered whether all three sections in Figure 2 included
paid or unpaid links. If we focus only on paid Ads (sections A and B),
Table 4, Panel B indicates only 21% of survey respondents answered
correctly.
These findings indicate a considerable degree of consumer uncer-
tainty and confusion about which content is paid or unpaid, and about
search page architecture more generally.
B. Adequacy ofDisclosure ofPaid Links
As noted previously, the Federal Trade Commission has issued a
statement requiring search engines to clearly and conspicuously dis-
close paid content, so that consumers can be aware of and distinguish
between compensated advertising and unpaid opinion or news con-
tent.164 We asked a series of questions to determine whether survey
161. Survey 3, Question 7.
162. Survey 3, Question 8.
163. Survey 3, Question 9.
164. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. To our knowledge the FTC has not
brought any enforcement actions pursuant to this policy against search engines. There is
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respondents thought that Google's disclosure was "clear" and whether
it was "conspicuous," and the most important reason they thought so.
We also asked whether they wanted more information about the dif-
ferences between paid and unpaid links, and for their suggestions for
improving search page architecture and labeling. We present the re-
sults in Table 5.
Table 5: Clarity in Search Page Architecture




Not Sure 17% 17%




Paid links in specific 30% 29%
section of search page
Paid links in shaded box 35% 34%
Paid links in section with 32% 30%
label "Ads"
Not sure/Do not know 3% 6%
Other 1% 1%
Panel C: Suggested Improvements in Labels/Architecture1 6 9
More clearly marked boundaries between 45%
paid/unpaid links
Change font or size of label for paid links 19%
Change words used in label for paid links 17%
Not sure/Do not know 15%
As Table 5 reflects, just under half of survey respondents thought
the distinction between paid and unpaid links was clear and almost
exactly the same percentage thought the distinction was conspicu-
also no other federal or state legislative mandate requiring search engines to clearly and
conspicuously label paid content.
165. Survey 3, Question 11.
166. Survey 3, Question 13.
167. Survey 3, Question 12.
168. Survey 3, Question 14.
169. Survey 3, Question 15.
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ous.170 There was little agreement on why the distinction was clear
and conspicuous, with roughly a third of survey respondents picking
each of the three primary options (paid links in separate section; paid
links in shaded box; paid links labeled "Ads"). There was also little
consensus on the best way to improve search output to make the dis-
tinction clearer, although one choice more clearly marked bounda-
ries between paid and unpaid links got more than twice as many
mentions as the next most popular choice.
Finally, we asked survey respondents whether they wanted more
information on the difference between paid and unpaid links.' 7 1 Inter-
estingly, although there was considerable consumer dissatisfaction
with the status quo, only 47% of survey respondents wanted more
information; 27% of survey respondents did not want more infor-
mation, and 26% did not care one way or another.172
C. Consumer Preferences and Expectations
What are consumers actually searching for when they use a
trademark as a search term? As noted previously, understanding con-
sumer preferences and expectations is necessary to assess whether
diversion or confusion is likely to occur.173 We began by asking sur-
vey respondents who had searched for a particular brand of product
whether they were usually interested in finding information about that
brand, or whether they were also interested in getting information
about similar products from other brands. A near majority, 47%, of
survey respondents indicated they usually wanted information about
the specific brand they had searched for, while 310% usually wanted
information about similar products from other brands, and 22% had
no preference. 174
A later survey asked more specifically what survey respondents
were looking for when they used the brand name of a product as a
170. The survey asked first whether the disclosure of paid content was "clear," and then
two questions later asked whether the disclosure of paid content was "conspicuous." Be-
cause we obtained almost exactly identical responses, it is possible that survey respondents
did not distinguish between these two elements in responding.
171. Cf Jansen & Resnick, supra note 129, at 1959 (finding that consumers are skeptical
of reliability and utility of paid ads). Such skepticism is not new. John E. Calfee & Debra
Jones Ringold, The 70% Majority: Enduring Consumer Beliefs About Advertising, 13 J.
PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 228, 228 (1994) ("What we find in the data is a remarkably
consistent majority view that advertising is useful and at the same time prone both to exag-
geration and the use of persuasion to encourage unnecessary purchases. Consumers also
consistently support regulation of advertising, or more precisely, they support stronger
regulation.").
172. Survey 3, Question 16.
173. See supra Part III.A.2.A.
174. Survey 1, Question 10.
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search term. We also asked what they expected to find if they clicked
on a paid link. Table 6 details the responses.
Table 6: Respondent Goals/Expectations
What I'm What I expect
looking forl75 to findl76
Products bearing that brand name 65% 45%
only
Products bearing that brand name 34% 39%
and similar competing brand names
Similar competing brand names N/A 100
only
Products having nothing to do with N/A 6%
the brand name
Other 1% 1%
These findings indicate that survey respondents have diverse
preferences and expectations when they use brand names as search
terms. Although a clear majority (65%) are only looking for products
bearing the brand name, substantially fewer (45%) expect to find only
products bearing that brand name when they click through. We probe
the issue of expectations further below.
D. Consumer Attentiveness to Search Page Architecture and Labels
Judges have assumed that consumers pay attention to search page
architecture and labels in deciding which links to click upon. We
accordingly asked survey respondents how search page architecture
affected which links they clicked on. We found little evidence that
survey respondents pay attention to search page architecture. More
specifically, 56% reported that they pay no attention to where on the
search results page the links are located, 60% reported that they pay
no attention to whether the link is in a shaded box, and 48% reported
that they pay no attention to whether the link is labeled a Sponsored
Link or Sponsored Result. A near-majority reported that they simp-
ly click on the first link for which they see the brand they are interest-
ed in, irrespective of whether the link is paid or unpaid.17 9
We also tested whether survey respondents were attentive to la-
bels by taking advantage of the fact that Google and Bing had
175. Survey 3, Question 21.
176. Survey 3, question 22.
177. See supra Part 111.A.2.
178. Survey 2, Questions 9, 11, and 12.
179. Survey 1, Question 12.
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switched labels in late 2010 and mid-2011, from "Sponsored Links"
and "Sponsored Sites" to "Ads."18 0 In our third survey, conducted
during February 2012, we asked respondents whether they had seen
one or more specific labels during the preceding two months. Dur-
ing this period, only "Ads" and "Sponsored Results" were being used,
but we included the label Google had discontinued more than a year
earlier ("Sponsored Links") as well as a fanciful response ("Commer-
cial Ads"). Table 7, Panel A presents the responses to this question,
with the two labels actually in use during the survey period bolded. 182
Table 7: Knowledge of Labels





Didn't notice any labels 22%
Panel B: How Accurately Do Respondents Identify Labels?
Identified only labels in use 13%
Identified some labels in use, and some not in use 51%
Identified only labels not in use 13%
Didn't notice any labels 22%
As Table 7, Panel A reflects, roughly half of survey respondents
reported seeing labels that were actually being used during the speci-
fled time period (46% for "Ads" and 49% for "Sponsored Results").
However, more than half of survey respondents also reported seeing a
label that had not been used for more than a year (55% for "Sponsored
Links"), and 33% reported seeing a label that had never been used
("Commercial Ads"). Finally, 22% of survey respondents reported not
noticing any labels.
Table 7, Panel B aggregates the responses in Panel A into those
respondents who provided correct responses only, those who had a
mix of correct and incorrect responses, those who had wrong respons-
es only, and those who didn't notice any labels. Only 13% of survey
respondents could correctly identify labels that had been in use for
more than a year. Another 13% of survey respondents picked com-
pletely wrong answers, and 22% of survey respondents didn't notice
180. See supra notes 26 and 28.
18 1. Schwartz, Google Does Away With "Sponsored Links, " supra note 28.
182. Survey 3, Question 4. As the numbering of this question indicates, we asked re-
spondents which labels they recalled seeing before we showed them Figure 2.
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any labels at all. These results call into question the utility of the la-
bels currently being employed, the size and prominence of the text in
which these labels are presented, and whether ordinary consumers
notice labels to begin with.
What label do consumers actually prefer? Before and after
Google and Bing adopted "Ads" as the label for paid links, we asked
respondents what label they wanted search engines to use to designate
paid links. Table 8 shows the results, with the labels in use during the
survey period bolded.
Table 8: Consumer Preferences for Paid Link Label
2010 Surveyl83 2012 Survey1 84
Paid Ads/Paid Advertisements 26% 35%
Sponsored Links 17% 13%
Sponsored Results 12% 17%
Ads or Advertisements 10% 13%
Not sure/No opinion 34% 19%
Other 1% 1%
As Table 8 reflects, "Paid Ads/Paid Advertisements" was the
most preferred option, but it only garnered 26-35% of survey re-
spondents. Strikingly, "Ads/Advertisements" was the preferred choice
of only 10% of survey respondents in 2010, and after more than a year
of Google and Bing using "Ads" to label paid links, its position was
essentially unchanged at 13%. "Not sure/no opinion" was the choice
of fully a third of survey respondents in 2010, and 19% in 2012. The-
se results indicate that most consumers pay little attention to labels,
and existing labels fail to effectively communicate which content is
paid rather than unpaid.
E. Paid Link Click-Through
In some cases, courts have effectively assumed that harm, in the
form of initial interest confusion, necessarily results when consumers
search for a trademark and paid links for a competitor appear.185
Courts have also assumed that the inclusion of the trademark in ad
text increases the likelihood of diversion and/or confusion.186
We used Figure 3, which is a screenshot of the right-side column
of Figure 1 to examine these issues.
183. Survey 2, Question 24.
184. Survey 3, Question 18.
185. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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website is from a competitor. The BMW ad does not reference
Mercedes, and the heading, URL and ad text all reference BMW. The
Gorgeous Luxury Vehicles ad does not reference Mercedes, but the
heading does not exclude the possibility, since Mercedes is a "gor-
geous luxury vehicle." However, the URL and ad text both reference
Livermore Audi.
For each of these ads, we asked respondents whether they would
click through. As Table 9 reflects, between 410% and 52% of survey
respondents answered "yes" (10-16%) or "maybe" (31-36%) to this
question, with Gorgeous Luxury Vehicles having the highest percent-
age of self-reported click-through.




Yes 10% 11% 16%
Maybe 31% 32% 36%
No 52% 49% 40%
Not sure/Do not know 6% 8% 8%
We also asked survey respondents who answered "yes" or "may-
be" to the preceding question why they would click on links for In-
finiti, BMW, or Gorgeous Luxury Vehicles when they had searched
for Mercedes. Table 10 provides the responses to this question.
187. The heading and website address both reference Infiniti, and the ad text states
"compare Mercedes to Infiniti on the Official Infiniti USA Website."
188. The specific question was as follows: "If you had run a search for Mercedes and got
these results, would you click on the link for Infiniti/BMW/Gorgeous Luxury Vehicles?"
Thus, we did not tell survey respondents why they had used Mercedes as a search term, and
left them free to answer the click-through question based on their own goals and expecta-
tions.
189. Survey 3, Question 23.
190. Survey 3, Question 28.
191. Survey 3, Question 33.
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Open to competing 52% 53% 36%
products
Expect to find 22% 25% 37%
information on Mercedes
Using Mercedes as a 100 12% 12%
generic description
Affiliation or 90 90 90
sponsorship arrangement
Other 4% 2% 4%
Not sure/Do not know 2% N/A 2%
Table 10 indicates that only a minority of survey respondents
(22-37% depending on the ad), click through because they expect to
find information on the trademarked good at the paid site. Most sur-
vey respondents (48-65% depending on the ad), click through be-
cause they have broad preferences, and are interested in a range of
luxury cars.195
Does ad text matter? Mercedes is only mentioned in the Infiniti ad
text, not in the BMW or Gorgeous Luxury Vehicles ad text. However,
willingness to click through and the expectation of finding infor-
mation on Mercedes is highest for Gorgeous Luxury Vehicles, and
substantially lower for Infiniti and BMW.196 Thus, at least in this set-
ting, ad text does not appear to be decisive.
F. Diversion and Confusion
Some courts have used diversion as a proxy for confusion.197 Ac-
cordingly, we began by asking survey respondents whether they per-
ceived that they had ever been diverted.198 Of those asked, 58%
192. Survey 3, Question 24.
193. Survey 3, Question 29.
194. Survey 3, Question 34.
195. To obtain figures for those with broad preferences, we combine those who are open
to competing products with those who are using Mercedes as a generic proxy term for luxu-
ry cars. Of course, survey respondents did not run a search using the term "Mercedes"; they
were instead presented with screenshots of search output after that search was run and asked
questions about the results.
196. See supra Table 9.
197. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
198. We deliberately chose not to define "diversion." For a discussion of the semantic
ambiguity of"diversion," see Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy, supra note 116.
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responded that they had been diverted, 29% indicated they had not
been diverted, and 13% were not sure. 199 We then asked those who
stated they had been diverted what they found at the site to which they
had been diverted, and allowed them to select more than one response.
Almost 60% responded that they had been taken to a site that sold or
serviced the product in which they were interested, rather than the
website of the product's manufacturer.200 Another 48% responded
that they had been taken to a site selling something different, and 39%
responded that they had been taken to the site of a competitor.201
Some of the difficulties with using diversion as a proxy for likeli-
hood of confusion/infringement are indicated by the fact that a majori-
ty of respondents thought it was diversion when they were directed to
a site that sold or serviced the product in question. We also asked re-
spondents who reported being diverted what they usually did next,
and again allowed them to select more than one response. Of those
respondents, 61% reported that they went back and did the Internet
search again, while 44% visited other sites returned by the original
20search. Another 20% responded that they looked at the site they
had been diverted to, and 14% closed down the web browser or shut
down their computer.203
In order to probe this issue more deeply, we included several
questions in our survey regarding the three paid links in Figure 3 pur-
chased by competitors of Mercedes (i.e., Infiniti, BMW, and Gor-
geous Luxury Vehicles). Specifically, we asked what survey
respondents would do if they clicked through and didn't find any in-
formation on Mercedes.204 Table 11 presents the results for each of
the three paid links.
199. Survey 1, Question 18.
200. Survey 1, Question 20.
201. Id.
202. Survey 1, Question 24.
203. Id.
204. As noted previously, we did not prompt survey respondents as to why they had used
Mercedes as a search term, thus leaving them free to answer subsequent questions based on
their own goals and expectations. See supra note 195.
[Vol. 26524
Trademarks as Keywords




Go back and find 62% 60% 64%
Mercedes link
Stay at site 25% 28% 23%
Not sure/don't know 13% 11% 12%
Other 0% 1% 1%
As Table 11 indicates, if the click-through did not result in the de-
sired information, a clear majority of survey respondents would simp-
ly go back and try another link. However, roughly 25% of survey
respondents would stay at the relevant site, even if it did not have in-
formation on Mercedes.
Finally, we asked survey respondents why they thought these
three paid links had appeared in a search for Mercedes. Table 12 pro-
vides the results, with the correct response, that the link had been paid
for and was an ad, in bold. As before, we included a fanciful response
("link selected by Google's special marketing team") as a control.




Paid Link 49% 51% 46%
Link selected by
Google's special 15% 16% 20%
marketing team
Mercedes has relation-
ship with website and 14% 11% 10%
authorized link
Not sure/Do not know 21% 21% 23%
Other 1% 1% 2%
205. Survey 3, Question 25.
206. Survey 3, Question 30.
207. Survey 3, Question 35.
208. Survey 3, Question 26.
209. Survey 3, Question 31.
210. Survey 3, Question 36.
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A bare/near majority selected the correct response: that Infiniti,
BMW, and Gorgeous Luxury Vehicles had paid Google to have their
links appear. Not sure/do not know was the next most popular re-
sponse, followed by our fanciful control. Between 10% and 14% of
survey respondents thought the links were authorized by Mercedes,
meaning that only a modest percentage of survey respondents appear
to be confused as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation. Thus, our find-
ings indicate that there is considerable confusion as to why the paid
links appear, but this confusion was not primarily about source, spon-
sorship, or affiliation.
G. Fairness Norms
Under U.S. trademark law, there is generally no liability for an
unauthorized use of a trademark unless that use causes or is likely to
cause consumer confusion as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation. 2 11
However, we tested whether survey respondents' norms regarding
fairness caused them to reach conclusions different than those recog-
nized by existing trademark law. Accordingly, we asked survey re-
spondents whether they thought it was "fair and appropriate" for a
link for a competitor (specifically, Infiniti, BMW, and Gorgeous Lux-
ury Vehicles) to show up as a paid ad when the search was for Mer-
cedes.2 12 Table 13 provides the results.
Table 13: Fairness Norms Regarding "Piggybacking"
Was it fair and appro- Gorgeous
priate for the paid link Infiniti BMW Luxury
to appear? Vehicles
2 1 5
Yes 35% 35% 44%
No 39% 40% 32%
Don't know/not sure 25% 25% 25%
A surprisingly high number of survey respondents did not believe
it was "fair and appropriate" for paid ads for Infiniti, BMW, and Gor-
geous Luxury Vehicles to appear in response to a search for Mer-
211. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 82 § 23:8.
212. We deliberately asked a compound question "fair and appropriate," rather than "fair
or appropriate," or asking separately about "fair" and "appropriate." We believed the more
restrictive criteria ("fair and appropriate") was the best way to capture whether survey re-
spondents had a different view of the equities than would be captured by a focus on likeli-
hood of confusion.
213. Survey 3, Question 27.
214. Survey 3, Question 32.
215. Survey 3, Question 37.
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cedes. After excluding those who responded "don't know/not sure,"
53% of survey respondents did not believe it was "fair and appropri-
ate" for Infiniti and BMW to have their paid links appear, while 42%
had that view for Gorgeous Luxury Vehicles.216 Thus, even in the
absence of much evidence of confusion as to source, sponsorship, and
affiliation, we find a considerable degree of hostility to the use of
trademarks as keywords by competitors.
H. Regression Analysis
As noted previously, we collected detailed demographic infor-
mation on survey respondents. We conducted extensive regression
analysis to determine whether any of these demographic factors pre-
dicted increased knowledge of search engine site architecture and la-
bels. The results were generally unimpressive. We did find some
evidence that younger and better-educated survey respondents report-
ed greater familiarity with site architecture, and demonstrated slightly
greater knowledge about the existence and location of paid links.
However, ignorance and obliviousness regarding the labels used cut
across all demographic groups. Further detail regarding our regression
analysis is available from the authors upon request.
V. DiscussioN
Our findings paint a rich and complicated picture of consumer
goals and expectations, and the environment in which trademarks are
bought and sold as search engine keywords. We discuss some of the
implications of our findings below.
A. Limitations of Our Findings
Our findings raise as many questions as they answer, and our an-
swers are necessarily tentative, given the specific questions we asked
and the fact that we cannot ask follow-up questions in online surveys.
Although survey respondents reflect a broad cross-section of the pop-
217
ulation, it does not automatically follow that our results are repre-
sentative of the population as a whole, let alone those who would be
selected to serve on a jury deciding a dispute involving the use of
trademarks as keywords.
216. If we do not exclude those who responded "don't know/not sure," a smaller but still
significant percentage (32% to 40%) of survey respondents thought it was not "fair and
appropriate" for paid ads for Infiniti, BMW, and Gorgeous Luxury Vehicles to appear in
response to a search for Mercedes. See supra Table 13 and accompanying text.
217. See infra Appendix.
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Our questions on propensity to click through were in the context
of a single search for a luxury car (Mercedes) that is unaffordable for
most of the population, and for the survey population.218 Different
results might be obtained with a trademark for a product that is pur-
chased more frequently or is more affordable, or in instances where
the ad text is more misleading. We also do not address the issues
raised by counterfeit goods.219 "Gorgeous Luxury Vehicles" is an
unusual legend for a website; survey respondents might be more will-
ing to click through because they are interested in pictures of gor-
geous luxury vehicles, rather than being interested in a Mercedes,
Infiniti, or BMW.
An additional limitation is that the surveys asked participants
what they had done previously, or would do in response to a specified
situation. Asking people to remember or predict their own behavior is
quite different than observing their actual behavior. Finally, responses
to particular questions may be affected by survey respondents' inter-
pretation of the goals of the survey. So, survey respondents might
conclude that there is something problematic about the use of trade-
marks as keywords from the simple fact that we constructed a survey
devoted to the issue. Additional work will be required to address these
limitations, to the extent they are remediable.
B. Framing of the Trademarks as Keywords Debate
The entire debate over the use of trademarks as keywords has
played out in the context of litigation over the use of trademarked
keywords by the plaintiffs direct competitors. Yet, our findings indi-
cate that such cases represent an extremely small minority of keyword
purchases.220 Indeed, as Table 2 indicates, in our sample of roughly
2500 trademarks, covering almost 19,000 ads, most of the ads bear no
resemblance to the ones that have given rise to litigation.221 Indeed,
we find that trademark owners account for twice as many ads as those
purchased by their direct competitors.222
218. Id.
219. To our knowledge, none of the links in Figures 1 & 3 involve counterfeit goods, but
the same cannot be said of all disputes involving the use of trademarks as keywords. For
example, in Rosetta Stone, the plaintiff complained that Google was allowing third parties
to purchase its trademark as a keyword to sell counterfeit goods. 676 F.3d at 152 (4th Cir.
2012). Similar concerns caused Tiffany to (unsuccessfully) sue eBay. See supra note 78. It
is difficult to measure the frequency with which counterfeit goods are sold by using trade-
marks as keywords, but such transactions obviously involve quite different dynamics than
those we study in this Article. See also note 244, infra (Google personnel unable to identify
whether ads for Rosetta Stone involved counterfeit goods).





Further, consumer expectations are both contextual and heteroge-
neous. Far more is going on in this virtual space than the fixation on
competitor purchases of trademarks would suggest. As such, there are
likely to be substantial transaction costs and real economic losses as-
sociated with a blanket prohibition on the use of trademarks as key-
words, or a "mother may I" system requiring advance consent of the
trademark owner.
C. Search Page Architecture and Labels
Courts that have handled disputes over trademarks as keywords
have been clear that search page architecture and labels matter. More
specifically, courts have assumed that consumers are knowledgeable
about the organization of search page output, and that the labels that
are used by search engines effectively signal to consumers the differ-
ence between paid and unpaid content.223
However, our findings suggest that the details of search page ar-
chitecture and labeling are a mystery to many consumers. Only
21% of survey respondents correctly identified both paid sections on
Figure 2. More than half of survey respondents reported seeing a label
that had not been used for more than a year; 33% reported seeing a
label that had never been used; and 22% of survey respondents report-
ed not noticing any labels whatsoever. Only 13% of survey respond-
ents answered our questions about labeling practices correctly, and
some of them probably guessed.225 These findings suggest that judges
should not assume a high level of consumer knowledge of search page
architecture and labeling.
A change in the assumed level of consumer knowledge has obvi-
ous implications for the analysis of the likelihood of confusion, at
least when someone other than the trademark owner purchases a
trademark as a keyword. More concretely, the likelihood of diversion
and/or confusion is higher when consumers are unable to identify
which content constitutes ads.
223. See supra Part III.A.2.C.
224. Our findings are consistent with earlier research indicating consumers pay little at-
tention to the labeling of search output. Rosso added labels classifying search output by
genre and discovered only a little over 50% (17 of 32) of subjects reported even noticing the
labels. Mark A. Rosso, Using Genre to Improve Web Search 152 (2005) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), available at
http://ils.unc.edu/-rossm/Rosso-dissertation.pdf. Google apparently encountered similar
dynamics when it was testing spelling correction ("did you mean: . . . ."), since many users
reported not noticing the phrasing or suggestion. E-mail from Mark A. Rosso, Assistant
Professor of Computer Info. Sys., N.C. Cent. Univ. Sch. of Bus., to David A. Hyman, H.
Ross and Helen Workman Chair in Law, Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law (Nov. 25, 2012) (on file
with author).
225. See supra Table 7.
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We think our findings warrant further evaluation by those respon-
sible for consumer protection issues on the Internet. Survey respond-
ents were not of one mind on the best way to improve the disclosure
of paid content, but it is obvious that the current approach is not work-
ing.
D. Trademark Inclusion in Ad Text
Courts and search engines have assumed that whether the trade-
mark is included in the ad text matters. For example, in GEICO, the
district court dismissed all claims for ad text that did not include the
GEICO trademark, while allowing claims that included the trademark
in ad text or headings to go forward.226 Similarly, in most of the
world, Google will not investigate a complaint unless the trademark
appears in the ad text,227 while in the United States, a trademark may
be used in ad text only when it amounts to comparative advertising
and nominative fair use.228 But is the inclusion of the trademark in ad
text that important?
Our findings on this issue are mixed. On the one hand, 510% of re-
spondents to our first survey stated that when conducting a search
they go to the first site where they see the name of the product they
are looking for.229 Thus, for many people, the appearance of a trade-
mark in the ad text could lure the searcher to that site. On the other
hand, in our third survey, we presented survey respondents with three
different ads, only one of which contained the trademark used in the
search. We found that survey respondents were most likely to click
through to an ad that did not contain the trademark, and were also
more likely to expect to find information about the trademarked prod-
uct at that site than at the site that used the trademark in ad text.2 30
To be sure, context is important. The site that used the trademark
in ad text was explicitly comparative ("Compare Mercedes to Infiniti
at the official Infiniti USA website"), while the site with higher click-
through and higher expectations had ad text that allowed for the pos-
sibility of finding information about Mercedes without actually using
the trademark in ad text ("Gorgeous Luxury Vehicles").2 31 But, this
explanation is less compelling when similar percentages of survey
respondents expected to find information on Mercedes at the paid link
226. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1841, 1848 (E.D. Va. 2005).
227. AdWords Trademark Policy, supra note 46.
228. See e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir.
1992).
229. See supra note 179.




that was explicitly comparative (Infiniti) and one that didn't include
the trademark at all (BMW).232
These findings suggest that consumer perceptions in this area are
highly context-dependent, and that the presence or absence of a
trademark in ad text is far from dispositive. Further research will be
necessary to determine the actual impact of including a trademark in
the ad text, but reliance on inclusion or exclusion as the primary factor
in determining whether there is actionable confusion substantially
oversimplifies a complex dynamic.
Busy judges understandably look for shortcuts in deciding com-
plex cases. Reliance on whether the trademark was included in the ad
text as a primary basis for inferring whether there was a likelihood of
confusion probably seemed like a plausible assumption at the time.
This particular decision rule, however, probably cannot hold the
weight that has been put on it.
E. Intent
Judges have been known to lower the boom on entities that de-
ceptively used the trademarks of direct competitors in keyword adver-
tising. 23 For example, in Rosetta Stone, the Fourth Circuit made a
series of adverse inferences about Google's intent, based on Google's
dismissal of its own internal studies indicating a high likelihood of
confusion and on Google's economic self-interest to sell trademarks
as keywords. 234
It is tempting to dismiss such cases as simply the trademark vari-
ation of the "pigs get fat, hogs get slaughtered" rule.2 35 Yet, the diver-
sity of consumer goals and expectations when using trademarks as
search terms suggests that more skepticism is appropriate before flatly
condemning purchases by direct competitors, or using the fact of such
232. See supra Table 10.
233. E.g., Binder v. Disability Grp., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1182-83 (C.D. Cal.
2011).
234. 676 F.3d 144, 156 (4th Cir. 2012).
235. Of course, whether the defendants in keyword cases are, in fact, "hogs" is an empir-
ical question. Professor Eric Goldman analyzed the results of six such suits and found evi-
dence that purchasing a competitor's trademarks as keywords is a dubious business strategy,
and suing competitors for doing so is even more dubious:
Brand owners usually are wasting money - often, a LOT of mon-
ey - bringing lawsuits over purportedly lost business attributable to
competitive keyword advertising. In fact, there's good reason to be-
lieve that brand owners lose little, if any, profits from the practice;
and even if they do, the costs of the law vastly exceed those lost prof-
its, making the litigation unprofitable.
Eric Goldman, Newly Released Consumer Survey Indicates that Legal Concerns About
Competitive Keyword Advertising Are Overblown (Forbes Cross-Post), ERIC GOLDMAN
TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Sept. 19, 2012, 7:40 AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2012/09/newly released.htm.
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purchases to infer bad intent among ad purchasers and search engines.
Stated more directly, if many users of search engines employ trade-
marks as generic proxy terms, to signify categories of products, it is
hard to see why direct competitors should be prohibited from purchas-
ing such trademarks as keywords. Nor should the fact of such pur-
chases be deemed to establish bad intent, as long as the purchaser
does not independently create actionable confusion.
F. Diversion
How common is diversion? In our first survey, we found that
many consumers reported clicking on the first result featuring the
name of what they are searching for.236 When we directly asked sur-
vey respondents whether they had experienced diversion (without
limiting our inquiry to paid links or to the use of trademarks as search
terms), a majority responded that they had.237 Finally, in our third
survey, a majority of survey respondents stated that when they use
trademarks as a search term they are only interested in the brand-name
product.238 When presented with Figure 3, roughly a quarter of survey
respondents indicated they would stay on the linked page, even if the
page did not include information on the product for which they had
originally searched.239 These findings suggest that diversion of some
form is fairly common.
Other findings suggest, however, that diversion is not a major
problem, and targeting "harmful diversion" under existing trademark
law will be quite challenging. Diversion cannot harm consumers un-
less they have both a specific destination in mind, and are not interest-
ed in alternatives. However, consumers actually have quite
heterogeneous goals and expectations. Most ads are unlikely to give
rise to confusion as to source.240 Click-through rates are often low,
and consumers can readily click back if they do not find what they
want. Given all these factors, the actual probability of harmful diver-
sion appears to be relatively modest.24 1
Consumer behavior is also important: Internet search has a ran-
dom walk aspect for many users, who go looking for X, stumble upon
Y, Z, and A, poke at A a bit, and then get distracted by B. Indeed, the
236. See supra note 179.
237. See supra note 199.
238. See supra note 175.
239. See supra Table 11.
240. See supra Table 12.
241. For example, if those with fixed goals and narrowly specified expectations make up
45% of the population, and those who click through make up 40% of the population, and
those who stay at the linked page for an appreciable amount of time make up 25% of those
who click through, the combined probability of harmful diversion is 45% x 40% x 25%=
4.5%.
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central metaphor - that users are "surfing the Internet" - indicates
the casual and contingent nature of the search process.242 When
search behavior is so unpredictable that we are unable to specify a
baseline against which to measure diversion, the task of differentiat-
ing harmful diversion from ordinary search behavior is challenging.
Finally, when we asked survey respondents to give an example of
diversion, the most frequent response was being taken to a site that
sold or serviced what the consumer had searched for, but not to the
company's official site.243 We are skeptical that this outcome actually
represents diversion in any form that is or ought to be legally actiona-
ble, and if it does, we doubt the administrability of a system that treats
it as such.
Thus, even though there are reasons for being concerned about
diversion, the evidence is mixed, and there are real implementation
challenges in operationalizing a prohibition. But, to focus on diversion
is to miss what is at stake in these cases. Competitors sue one another
for keyword purchases (and sue search engines for keyword sales)
because they believe such conduct misappropriates the signaling value
of their trademarks, so as to steer consumers and sales elsewhere. As
this formulation indicates, the real complaint of trademark owners is
unfair competition, and they are using an initial interest diver-
sion/confusion framework because trademark doctrine doesn't really
map onto the conduct they are complaining about. We return to this
issue below.
G. Likelihood of Confusion
Apart from cases involving dilution, likelihood of confusion must
be proven to establish trademark infringement. As noted previously,
the focus is whether an appreciable number of relevant consumers are
likely to mistakenly believe that the defendant's goods come from the
plaintiff, that the plaintiff has sponsored the defendant, or that the
plaintiff and defendant are affiliated. One initial challenge is that
source, sponsorship, and affiliation are not categories that map direct-
242. See Jean Armour Polly, Birth of a Metaphor - The Nascence of Surfing the Inter-
net, NETMOM.COM (Mar. 22, 2008, 9:00 AM), http://www.netmom.com/about-net-mom/25-
meet-net-mom/26-surfing-the-internet.html. The person who coined the metaphor described
the logic of her choice of words:
In casting about for a title for the article, I weighed many possible
metaphors. I wanted something that expressed the fun I had using the
Internet, as well as hit on the skill, and yes, endurance necessary to
use it well. I also needed something that would evoke a sense of ran-
domness, chaos, and even danger. I wanted something fishy, net-like,
nautical.
Id.
243. See supra note 200.
No. 2] 533
Harvard Journal ofLaw & Technology
ly or easily onto the online search setting in which trademarks are
used as keywords.
Should we be testing to find out whether an appreciable number
of users mistakenly believe that the trademark owner owns, or has
some corporate affiliation, or licenses its trademark to the specific
linked site at issue? Or should we be testing whether an appreciable
number of users mistakenly believe that they can purchase the trade-
marked good (or obtain information on the same) at the specific
linked site at issue? Should these determinations be made based on the
text of the paid link itself, or on the website after one clicks through,
or on the simple fact that the offending paid link appeared after a
trademark was used as a search term? How much confusion (in per-
centage terms) needs to be demonstrated for the case to go to a jury?
Should it matter if defendant's employees and experts are unable to
identify which ads are confusing with regard to source, sponsorship,
and affiliation? 244 Finally, should it matter that most of the paid links
that result from keyword searches for trademarks pose no likelihood
of confusion? Unfortunately, the consumer confusion surveys that
were done in all but one of the litigated cases provide little insight into
these issues.24 5
We document a considerable degree of confusion, but it is not the
type of confusion recognized by current trademark doctrine. We find a
modest amount of confusion on source, sponsorship, and affiliation,
but we find considerably more confusion and uncertainty regarding
whether a particular link is an ad or not, why particular links appeared
in response to a given search, and what the user expects to find if they
click on a particular link.
Thus, in our third survey, we asked respondents why they thought
Infiniti, BMW, and Gorgeous Luxury Vehicles had shown up in a
search for Mercedes. Between 21% and 23% of those responding
didn't know or were unsure, and an additional 15-20% picked a fanci-
ful response added as a control.246 Only 10-14% of respondents
thought that "Mercedes has a special relationship with Infini-
ti/BMW/Gorgeous Luxury Vehicles, and authorized this link to ap-
pear when someone searches for Mercedes." 2 47 In the aggregate, this
means that almost half of those responding were confused as to why
ads for Infiniti, BMW, and Gorgeous Luxury Vehicles appeared in
244. For example, in Rosetta Stone v. Google, Inc., several of Google's in-house attor-
neys were unable to determine which ads were placed by Rosetta Stone, competitors of
Rosetta Stone, unauthorized resellers, and counterfeiters. 676 F.3d 144, 158 (4th Cir. 2012).
245. In FPX, LLC v. Google, Inc., the plaintiffs expert separately asked whether users
thought that specific paid ads were sponsored by or affiliated with the trademark owner, or
that the linked site was related to the trademark owner. An Empirical Analysis, supra note
138, at 8.




response to a search for Mercedes, but less than 15% reported confu-
sion as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation.
When we asked a similar question to determine why survey re-
spondents would click on an ad, a smaller percentage (9%) responded
that they believed there was an affiliation or sponsorship agreement
between Infiniti/BMW/Gorgeous Luxury Vehicles and Mercedes. 24 8
Strikingly, in responding to the same question, 22% (Infiniti), 25%
(BMW), and 37% (Gorgeous Luxury Vehicles) of survey respondents
indicated they expected to find information on Mercedes at the paid
link.249 Infiniti's ad ("Compare Mercedes to Infiniti on the Official
Infiniti USA Website") certainly implies that a user should expect to
receive such information, while BMW and Gorgeous Luxury Vehi-
cles' ads do not, but Infiniti had the lowest percentage of users expect-
ing to find information on Mercedes of the three. 250
Finally, we asked users what they would expect to find when they
clicked on a paid link after using a trademark as a search term. A near
majority (45%) expected that the paid links would only provide in-
formation about products bearing the trademark.251 A smaller number
(39%) expected that the paid links would provide information about
both products bearing that trademark and competing brand name
products, while 10% expected information only about competing
brand name products, and 6% expected to find information about
products having nothing to do with the brand name used as a search
term.252 Of course, these are aggregate findings. Table 2 makes it
clear that survey respondents are actually over-estimating the fre-
quency of keyword purchases by competitors, which should make
claims of confusion even harder to sustain.
Viewed broadly, these findings provide evidence of confusion,
but the confusion is not about source, sponsorship, or affiliation. In-
stead, users appear to be confused - or, to use less loaded phrasing,
uncertain - about what they will find when they click on paid links.
For the paid links in Figure 3, a material number of survey respond-
ents believe that when they click on a paid link for Infiniti, BMW, or
Gorgeous Luxury Vehicles, they will find information about the prod-
uct they were searching for (Mercedes), while many other have no
such expectations.253 Regardless, if consumers are using trademarks
as search terms because they are interested only in the trademarked
product, the mismatch between consumer expectations and the reality
248. See supra Table 10.
249. Id.
250. See supra Figure 3.
251. See supra Table 6.
252. Id.
253. See supra Table 10.
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of what they will find at paid links will predictably increase consumer
search costs.
To the extent we do find evidence of confusion as to source,
sponsorship, and affiliation, it is at the low end of the range found in
earlier cases.254 Of course, likelihood of confusion is context-
dependent. We only tested one search term (Mercedes) and three paid
ads involving well-known automotive companies that compete with
Mercedes. All three paid ads in Figure 3 included the trademarks of
those competitors, either in the ad heading, ad text, or the URL. Other
combinations of trademarks and ads might well generate higher levels
of confusion as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation. Indeed, given the
prominence of the brands in question, it is somewhat disconcerting to
find that fully 11% of survey respondents thought BMW was affiliat-
ed with Mercedes, and 14% of respondents thought Infiniti was affili-
ated with Mercedes. 2 55
To summarize, we find little evidence of confusion in the tradi-
tional sense, but there is plenty of uncertainty about other matters.
Such uncertainty is not actionable under existing trademark law, and
the FTC guidelines only require disclosure of advertising to be "clear
and conspicuous."256 We focus below on whether a "diversion-as-
free-riding" rationale could supply an alternative basis for addressing
this issue even if evidence of confusion in the traditional sense is lack-
ing.
H. Survey Complexities
In a blog post, Professor Rebecca Tushnet suggests that we may
have overstated the number of survey respondents who are confused
about search page architecture.257 In particular, she states:
I have some quibbles with the interpretations, particu-
larly with respect to the control/distractor question
about Google's selection of ads that isn't really a con-
trol since a reasonable consumer might well think that
Google's marketing department selects ads. Someone
who selected that "control" to classify a link seems
likely to understand that the link is there because
Google hopes to get paid for it, even if they're confused
about conscious/case-by-case selection. Adding those
254. See supra Table 1.
255. See supra Table 12.
256. See supra note 21.
257. Rebecca Tushnet, Empirical Study on Trademarks as Keywords, REBECCA




responses to the "paid advertising" responses changes
some results significantly. 25 8
We agree with Professor Tushnet that our fanciful control ("link
selected by Google's special marketing team") does not expressly
indicate whether or not payment would result to Google, but we do
not agree that this fact undercuts our analysis. For each of the three
questions that included this fanciful control,259 our goal was to offer
an answer that was clearly correct, and other answers that were either
wrong, or not nearly as "correct" as the right answer. We drafted the
fanciful control to try and give people the option of a response that
was wrong, but looked plausible, in order to give us some insight into
the number of people who were guessing, misinformed, or confused.
The "special marketing team" response is not the best answer to
any of the three questions for it was offered, which is why we did not
treat it as a correct response. There is no such thing as a Google "spe-
cial marketing team," and even if there was, the mythical special mar-
keting team doesn't select the links that end up in the paid and unpaid
sections of Google's search output, which is what the question was
about.
Further, the "special marketing team" cannot be counted as the
correct answer to questions about both paid and unpaid sections of the
search output page. As Table 4 reflects, 15-17% of survey respond-
ents picked the fanciful response for Sections A & B, the paid regions
of Google's search output, but 110% picked the fanciful response for
Section C, an unpaid region of Google's search output page. We view
these findings as further evidence of generalized confusion or uncer-
tainty about search output architecture.
Finally, in a follow-up survey conducted after receiving Professor
Tushnet's original comments, we asked exactly the same question,
and gave survey respondents the same answers, but added language
that made it clear that our fanciful control did not involve payment to
Google.260 The results were effectively unchanged: 13% of survey
respondents selected the fanciful control for Section A, and 17% of
survey respondents selected it for Section B (the paid regions of
Google's search output). Fully 19% of survey respondents picked the
fanciful control for Section C (the unpaid region of the search output
page). Thus, we do not believe the issue identified by Professor Tush-
net changes the results of our analysis.
258. Id.
259. See supra Table 4.
260. Specifically, the fanciful control in the follow-up survey was as follows: "Links se-
lected by Google's special marketing team. The listed companies do not pay Google to
appear in this section."
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We appreciate Professor Tushnet's careful review of our method-
ology and findings. No matter how carefully one designs a survey,
ambiguities and weaknesses are discovered only after the survey has
been fielded. Our three surveys and the fanciful control we construct-
ed for the third survey are no exception to that rule.
I Whither Trademark Law: Confusion, Free-Riding, or Both?
Although nationally famous trademarks are also protected against
dilution, American trademark law focuses on confusion over source,
sponsorship, or affiliation.261 Conversely, some European countries
grant trademark owners protection against those who would take un-
fair advantage of well-known marks.262 To what extent does the Eu-
ropean approach track the moral intuitions of ordinary Americans
about the boundaries of appropriate trademark use? Our most surpris-
ing finding is that wholly apart from whether there is actionable con-
fusion as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation, survey respondents are
split on whether it is "fair and appropriate" for direct competitors to
purchase one another's trademarks as keywords. These findings sug-
gest that concerns about free-riding have considerable salience for
ordinary consumers, even though they are largely ignored by the tradi-
tional U.S. focus on confusion. The adoption of the initial interest
confusion framework - even in circumstances where confusion is
difficult to establish - seems to indicate that some courts are willing
to use trademark law to address such free-riding, despite scathing crit-
icism from some academics and judges.263
261. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006 & Supp. V 2012), amended by Pub. L. 112-190,
§ 1(b), 126 Stat. 1436 (2012).
262. Council Directive 89/104, 1988 O.J. (L 40) 1 (EU). But see Case C-323/09, Inter-
flora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer PLC, 2011 E.C.R. 1-0000 (limiting the applicability of this
doctrine to the purchase of keywords).
263. For example, Judge Berzon of the Ninth Circuit has written that online users who
are diverted to competing websites after searching for a trademarked term are likely not
confused, but are rather making legitimate consumer choices:
There is a big difference between hijacking a customer to an-
other website by making the customer think he or she is visiting the
trademark holder's website (even if only briefly), which is what may
be happening in this case when the banner advertisements are not la-
beled, and just distracting a potential customer with another choice,
when it is clear that it is a choice. True, when the search engine list
generated by the search for the trademark ensconced in a metatag
comes up, an internet user might choose to visit westcoastvideo.com,
the defendant's website in Brookfield, instead of the plaintiffs mov-
iebuff.com website, but such choices do not constitute trademark in-
fringement off the internet, and I cannot understand why they should
on the internet.
For example, consider the following scenario: I walk into Ma-
cy's and ask for the Calvin Klein section and am directed upstairs to
the second floor. Once I get to the second floor, on my way to the
Calvin Klein section, I notice a more prominently displayed line of
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State and federal law sometimes prohibits unjustified free-riding
on another's reputation. In 2007, Utah banned competitive keyword
advertising.264 The sponsor of the legislation argued that such adver-
tising was a form of "identify theft," which he analogized to "carjack-
ing" someone else's trademark, and bemoaned the fact that "in some
cases people invest millions on their trademark, only to have their
customers' online word searches shanghaied by a pirate who bought
off the search engines."265 Similarly, the right of publicity, which has
been recognized by many states,266 allows individuals to control the
commercial use of their identities.267 Under federal law, the Anti-
Cybersquatting Protection Act ("ACPA") makes it illegal to register a
domain name that includes a third party's trademark if a bad faith in-
tent to profit accompanies the registration or use of that domain
name.26 Finally, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers ("ICANN") has a Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolu-
tion Policy ("UDRP"), which uses a framework similar to the ACPA's
bad-faith-intent-based approach to determine domain name owner-
ship.2 69
To be sure, social norms regarding fairness can evolve, and there
are social costs to over-regulation. These costs can be large in dynam-
Charter Club clothes, Macy's own brand, designed to appeal to the
same people attracted by the style of Calvin Klein's latest line of
clothes. Let's say I get diverted from my goal of reaching the Calvin
Klein section, the Charter Club stuff looks good enough to me, and I
purchase some Charter Club shirts instead. Has Charter Club or Ma-
cy's infringed Calvin Klein's trademark, simply by having another
product more prominently displayed before one reaches the Klein
line? Certainly not.
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Berzon, J., concurring). For other critiques, see Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy, supra
note 116, at 565-70.
264. Trademark Protection Act, 2007 Utah Laws 365.
265. Dan Eastman, Identity Theft: The Next Generation, THE SENATE SITE (Apr. 5, 2007,
7:44 PM), http://senatesite.com/blog/2007/04/identity-theft-next-generation.html. But see
Eric Goldman, Keyword Advertising as Corporate Identity Theft- Sen. Eastman Defends
New Utah Law, Banning Keyword Advertising, ERIC GOLDMAN TECH. & MARKETING L.
BLOG (Apr. 9, 2007, 11:25 AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2007/04/keyword
adverti.htm.
266. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 6:8 (2d ed.
2012) (listing right of publicity statutes in nineteen states).
267. Id. § 1:3. Interestingly, these right of publicity statutes are available to any trade-
mark owner whose name is their trademark; and in such instances, proof of consumer con-
fusion would not be required. Id. § 6:145. As noted previously, we are aware of one case in
which a party sought to use state law regarding the right of publicity to address the purchase
of a name as a keyword. See supra note 77.
268. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006).
269. ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy § 4(a) (Oct. 24, 1999),
http://archive.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm. Among the elements that must be
proven in order to win a transfer of a domain name under the UDRP Policy is that the do-
main name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. Id. § 4(b).
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ic spaces, such as online search.270 But, the alternative is to rely solely
on an ex post confusion-based liability regime, which has its own un-
certainties and costs as well. It remains to be seen whether regulation
that is explicitly framed around an anti-free-riding rationale would
out-perform the confusion-based legal regime that currently governs
this space. Rather than analyzing the dispute over keyword advertis-
ing through only the traditional confusion-based framework, we
should at least consider the costs and benefits of a different approach.
J The Perils of Casual Empiricism
Our findings are more suggestive than determinative, and much
remains to be learned about how consumers understand and use the
online search environment. The search process is also dynamic: while
we conducted this research, Bing and Google changed the labels they
used to describe paid links and Google reconfigured its paid link
space and began using a label it had discontinued more than a year
earlier.2 7 1
That said, our findings call into question many of the assumptions
made by judges in resolving disputes arising out of the use of trade-
marks as keywords. As noted previously, judges made assumptions
about: (1) consumer goals and expectations when trademarks are used
as search terms, (2) advertiser (and/or search engine) intent when pur-
chasing or selling a trademarked keyword, (3) consumer understand-
ing of search page architecture and labeling of results, (4) the
significance of the trademark appearing in the ad text, (5) the likeli-
hood of diversion, and (6) the likelihood of confusion. Assumptions in
each of these areas were doubtless plausible at the time, but such cas-
ual empiricism should give way to actual evidence on the subject
when it is available.2 72
K. What is Really at Stake?
Framing the controversy over the use of trademarks as search en-
gine keywords obscures what is really at stake. Trademark owners
270. Professor Eric Goldman has argued against regulation of keyword search advertising
on various grounds. In his view, the absence of trademark liability has allowed search tools
to evolve organically, in response to consumer demand. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, With Its
Australian Court Victory, Google Moves Closer to Legitimizing Keyword Advertising Glob-
ally (Forbes Cross-Post), ERIC GOLDMAN TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Feb. 19, 2013
9:32 AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/02/with its austra.htm.
271. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
272. We do not mean to suggest that there is no role for armchair empiricism, nor that
empirical evidence must be presented on each and every aspect of every dispute. There are
efficiencies to armchair empiricism in this area of the law - as there are in other areas of
the law. The challenge is to decide when to insist on actual empirical evidence, instead of
relying on armchair empiricism.
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have a Lockean rights-based claim to profit from (and, to a reasonable
extent, control) the property they have created, including the right to
profit from the collateral value of their marks when used as Internet
search terms. At the same time, Google has created and popularized
the platform that makes the same trademarks valuable as search terms,
and therefore has its own competing Lockean rights-based claim to
profit from the sale of any and all search terms on that platform. Fi-
nally, consumers have diverse preferences and goals. Markets, togeth-
er with the institutions that enable them, are typically best justified as
means by which such preferences can be maximized. Some consum-
ers that use a trademark as a search term prefer to be able to choose
from a diverse range of goods and services. The ads that accompany
search results benefit them by supporting Google's free search ser-
vices, and allowing them the opportunity to buy products that they
were not necessarily thinking about, but were at least open to. Other
consumers are only interested in products bearing the specific trade-
mark they entered as a search term. They too benefit from the free
search services that Google provides, and they can only be diverted if
they click on the "wrong" paid ad.
Given the complex nature of these competing claims - pitting
rights against rights, and rights against social utility - we should stop
pretending that these disputes present a straightforward legal issue
that only requires the parsing of a trademark statute or the application
of a multi-factor likelihood of confusion test. Indeed, analyzing these
issues within the boundaries set by existing trademark doctrine,
whether consumer confusion or dilution, obscures the real choice that
judges and legislators will have to make.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our findings indicate that the issues raised by the use of trade-
marks as keywords are complex and multidimensional. That said, our
findings suggest that using diversion as a proxy for likelihood of con-
fusion is unlikely to generate satisfactory results. Diversion is not the
same thing as likelihood of confusion, and trying to force evidence of
diversion into a box labeled "initial interest confusion" will not make
diversion into trademark infringement.
Next, there is considerable evidence of consumer confusion and
uncertainty, but it is not the sort of consumer confusion at which
trademark law is directed. Instead, consumers are confused and uncer-
tain as to which sections of search output are paid and which are un-
paid, why particular links appear in response to any given search, and
what exactly consumers should expect to find when they click on any
given link.
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Our findings also provide some evidence that consumer expecta-
tions regarding "fair and appropriate" use of trademarks do not map
neatly onto the type of protections provided by U.S. trademark law. It
remains to be seen whether trademark law should be harmonized with
consumer expectations - or vice-versa.
Finally, it is important to recognize that all empirical work has
limitations and deficiencies. This study is no exception. But our study
provides a far better foundation for discussion and analysis of the le-
gal and policy issues associated with the use of trademarks as key-
words than the casual empiricism that courts have engaged in to date.
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APPENDIX: TABLES
543
Demographics of Survey Respondents 273
Attribute 1st Survey 2nd Survey 3rd Survey
Date of Survey May 2010 Oct.0ov. Feb. 2010
_____________________2010 _____
Participants 1002 1003 1003
Gender % Male 49% 50% 50%
% High school 22% 22% 23%
Education % Some college 36% 36% 
35%
0% BA or% B or41% 42% 42%
graduate degree
18-24 15% 15% 14%
25-44 39% 40% 44%
Age 45-64 34% 33% 35%
>65 12% 12% 8%
Single 48% 47% 44%
Married 45% 46% 45%
Family Living Together 7% 7% 11%
Status
% with children 31% 33% 34%
at home
White 73% 72% 75%
African Ameri- 10% 10% 11%
Race/ can
Ethnicity Hispanic 7% 7% 5%
Asian 7% 7% 6%
MixedMied3% 4% 2%
Race/Other
<$50k 41% 42% 41%
Household $50k-$100k 39% 38% 42%
Income >$100k 20% 20% 17%
273. Percentages in each category may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

